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“[It is] probably the greatest and most horrible crime ever committed in the history of the 
world.”  



















 While an academic work may not include every piece of evidence the author found, the 
reader should have faith that the author omitted evidence because it was unnecessary, not 
because he or she missed it. I do not speak Hungarian, nor have I ever been to Hungary, so I 
cannot make that promise. I found plenty of sources in English (some of which were translated 
from Hungarian), but it is only a fraction of what exists. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán 
once opined: “in order to understand a country one not only needs knowledge of the language, 
but one must also be familiar with the culture… Those who don’t have such a cultural insight 
will hardly be able to give a reliable and serious opinion on the political debates in another 
country.”1 While this is a perfectly reasonable statement there are a few caveats. 
 First, the Hungarian radical right’s historiography is part of a transnational movement 
that whitewashes memory of historical oppressors. In Russia, a majority believes that Stalin was 
a better leader than Gorbachev, and the government glorifies him for his leadership during World 
War II.2 In Poland the government has moved to criminalize scholarly discussion of Polish 
complicity in the Holocaust. Orbán’s Hungary is a particular version of a wider phenomenon that 
I have sought to understand. In the United States a portrait of Andrew Jackson—the architect of 
the Trail of Tears—sat in President Trump’s oval office. The Trump administration also sought 
to rewrite the history of North American slavery and instill young Americans with a “patriotic 
education.” The populist radical right is flourishing not only across Europe and North America 
 
1 “Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio programme “Good Morning Hungary,” The Prime Minister, 
Website of the Hungarian Government, May 8 2020, http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-
the-kossuth-radio-programme-good-morning-hungary-15/. 
2 David Masci, “In Russia, nostalgia for Soviet Union and positive feelings about Stalin,” Fact Tank, Pew Research 




but across the globe—in Modi’s India, Bolsonaro’s Brazil, and Erdogan’s Turkey, to name just a 
few places. Although I do not bring personal experience with Hungarian public history to the 
table, I am a student of the radical right phenomenon more generally, particularly how it has 
manifested itself here in the United States.  
 The second caveat is that although the Hungarian government claims to be turning 
inward—allegedly to focus on its own heritage and culture for political inspiration—it is seeking 
at the same time to be emblematic; its political model and historical revisionism are for export. 
In Hungary, monuments which revive the right-wing interwar regime and its beliefs tower over 
tourist sites. The House of Terror, Hungary’s national museum devoted to the victims of fascism 
and communism, sees hundreds of thousands of visitors yearly, many of them international. The 
museum rejects the common perception that while fascism was evil in conception, communism 
was only a miscalculation to serve its message on the insidious nature of leftism. In the words of 
Dovid Katz, an expert on “double-genocide” historiography, “As the number of Holocaust 
survivors and children of survivors dwindles each year, the new paradigm is ever more easily 
transferred to the West by the many thousands who have been exposed to these Eastern 
European museums… to those of non-Jewish background, visits often lead to the idea that Soviet 
crimes represented the bulk of what is called genocide in the area.”3 Hungary’s historical 
revisionism is significant internationally regardless of an individual’s familiarity with Hungarian 
history, culture, and politics because it seeks to alter assumptions about twentieth-century 
atrocity across the world.  
 
3 Dovid Katz, “Is Eastern European ‘Double Genocide’ Revisionism Reaching Museums?” Dapim: Studies in 
Holocaust (2016), 12-13.  
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 Finally, we should push back against the Prime Minister’s assertion that one must be 
geographically and culturally embedded in the issues they debate. The historical discipline by its 
nature removes evidence from its context, and while political actors are motivated by their 
interests, it is the role of the historian to take a more bird’s-eye view of a matter. This is not to 
say that I approach the debate without biases, but that I can be open about how they impact my 
arguments. Indeed, while I consider myself a liberal, the fact that I have no personal stake in 
Hungarian politics helps me to frame the radical right’s views in a way that is fair to them, rather 
than rejecting them outright.  
 
Definition of Terms 
 I define the radical right as the space on the political spectrum between the moderate 
right—such as Angela Merkel and Mitt Romney, and the extreme right—for example, neo-
Nazis. The extreme right believes in an openly racist state and rejects “the essence of 
democracy.”4 But the radical right—the focus of this thesis— “accepts the essence of 
democracy, but opposes fundamental elements of liberal democracy, most notably minority 
rights, rule of law, and separation of powers.”5 For example, the radical right in Germany and 
Hungary often call for popular referendums to protest immigration. According to the radical 
right, majority rule should be strong enough to overrule the civil liberties of minorities. While 
the extreme right is often violent, the radical right aspires to gain power by democratic means. 
However, through its populism the radical right can erode the underpinnings of democracy.  
 
4 Cas Mudde, The Far Right Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019), 7.  
5 Mudde, The Far Right Today, 7. 
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 To understand populism, we can contrast it against pluralism which holds that 
disagreement is healthy and politicians should tolerate opposing views. The 2008 presidential 
race in which Barak Obama and John McCain treated each other as political adversaries as 
opposed to hated enemies is an example of pluralism. Populism, on the other hand, “considers 
society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure 
people’ and the ‘corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the 
general will of the people.”6 The radical right is populist because it holds that liberals are not 
only misguided but morally corrupt. Donald Trump’s descriptions of a liberal “deep-state” or 
“swamp” are populistic, as are the Hungarian radical right’s accusations that George Soros wants 
to destroy Hungary’s independence for his financial gain. Populists argue that they channel a 
national will which all true members of the nation endorse. Parties that disagree are illegitimate. 
While populists claim to be democratic, they attack the pluralistic underpinnings of liberal 
democracy, such as the independence of constitutional courts, higher education, and the media.  
 
 
The Hungarian populist radical right’s main policies and actions include: 
1. Expansion of government power into the media 
2. Anti-separation of powers through constitutional changes 
3. Anti-independence of higher education 
4. Anti-immigration/Islamophobia 
5. Fostering diplomatic and trade relations with authoritarian states 
 
6 Cas Mudde, On Extremism and Democracy in Europe (New York: Routledge, 2016), 68.  
6 
 
6. Promoting an ethnic understanding of Hungarian national membership through 

























Introduction: The Sixth Coffin 
 1989 was an eruption rivaled in hope and turmoil in contemporary history only by the 
Arab Spring of 2011. From Tiananmen Square to the graves of the Ceaușescus in Romania, and 
the crumbling Berlin Wall, communist subjects chanted for the end of dictators.  
 In that year, a young Viktor Orbán spoke before a crowd gathered in Budapest’s Hero’s 
Square to memorialize the murder of Hungary’s most prominent dissidents and rebury their 
remains. Among those to be honored was Imre Nagy, a liberal-minded communist who had been 
executed by the Soviet-backed Kádár regime in the aftermath of the 1956 revolution. Though the 
regime that executed him remained in power, in 1989 it was unwilling to stamp out the coming 
revolution without Soviet military backing. Hungary’s prominent dissidents shifted 
uncomfortably when the young and largely unknown Orbán approached the phalanx of 
microphones. They were on the cusp of a revolution without violence or Soviet intervention, but 
Orbán’s Fidesz party had spent the night before taunting the Soviet embassy: “Your visa has 
expired! Russians go home!”7  
 Long-haired, Orbán wore no necktie to emphasize the party’s youth. Although there were 
five dead dissidents at the ceremony, there were six coffins: the final one was symbolically 
reserved for the nameless young people tyrannized by the communists after 1956. “It was in fact 
then, in 1956,” Orbán declared, when our youth was taken away from us “by the Hungarian 
Socialist Workers’ Party.”8 While the liberal dissidents had cooperated with the communist party 
to affect a transition, Orbán mocked the aged party-men for attending the reburial of the men 
 
7 “Hungary Twenty Years Ago: The Rise of Viktor Orbán,” Hungarian Spectrum, June 21, 2009. 
https://hungarianspectrum.org/2009/06/21/hungary-twenty-years-ago-the-rise-of-viktor-orban/.   
8 “1989 - Orbán Viktor Nagy Imre újratemetésén - Viktor Orbán's Speech at the Reburial of Imre Nagy,” 
GeneralForgeron, April 24, 2020, Video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g91-OTiXVkw.  
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they had murdered: “we do not understand that those leaders of the party and the state, who have 
ordered our education from the books that have falsified the revolution, are almost stampeding 
each other to touch these caskets as a lucky talisman of sorts.”9 To Orbán, the smooth transition 
threatened his goal for Hungary’s complete break with the old regime and repudiation of the 
communist system, and he sought to enrage the crowd before the revolution’s tension subsided 
completely into the work of forming a new government. 
 
Viktor Orbán speaking in Hero’s Square 16 June 1989.10 
It wasn’t until 2010 that Hungary finally experienced its “revolution at the ballot box” 
when, following the left-wing government’s failure to ameliorate the effects of the 2008 
Financial Crisis, Fidesz was voted into executive and legislative power with a two-thirds 
supermajority.11 Hungary’s Prime Minister since 2010, Viktor Orbán ensured Fidesz’ longevity 
by stacking Hungary’s constitutional court with loyalists, modifying the constitution, attacking 
the independence of higher education, and using crony tactics to starve out and purchase 
opposition media. In the words of political scientist Michael Ignatieff, it is one of history’s 
 
9 “Viktor Orbán's Speech at the Reburial of Imre Nagy.” 
10 http://budapestbeacon.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/orban.png. 




greatest “curveballs” that right wing authoritarianism emerged from liberal anti-communism.12 
However, in hindsight perhaps we should have seen the seeds of Orbán’s authoritarianism in his 
desire to manipulate the past at the end of the Cold War.  
Unlike Donald Trump’s murky allusion to a time when America was “great,” the 
Hungarian radical right’s construction of the past is crystal clear, prominent, and sophisticated. It 
exists in museums and statues; politicians refer to specific dates and historical figures. The 
government’s historiography articulates and distorts the past to serve political ends; its 
presentation of the Holocaust serves its nationalist narrative in which foreign empires robbed 
Hungary of its sovereignty, taking away its historical agency and threatening to destroy its 
identity. Fidesz’ historiography finds support in public intellectuals, including PhD historians 
such as Mária Schmidt and Sándor Szakály. Fidesz’s government spokesman, Zoltán Kovács, is 
a former historian and Prime Minister Orbán has studied law, Political Science, and holds a 
Master’s Degree. The misguided nature but internal coherence of the radical right demands that 
we engage with its views seriously rather than dismissing them out of hand. The main goals of 
my thesis are to contextualize the government’s presentation of twentieth-century Hungarian 
history against academic findings and to understand how the government’s framing serves to 
justify its radical-right wing positions, namely its nationalism, Euroscepticism, and 
Islamophobia.   
In Chapter 1, I examine the 2002 House of Terror Museum in Budapest which focuses on 
the impact of Hungary’s “double-occupation” in 1944-1945 by Nazi Germany and the Red 
Army. The House of Terror uses the historical authenticity of its building as a center for both 
 




fascist and communist forces at different times to metaphorically convey their similarity. In 
doing so, it served the government’s 2002 portrayal of the past in which fascism and communism 
posed a twin threat to Hungary’s independence and internal unity, depriving Hungary of its 
agency during the Holocaust. The House of Terror emphasizes that the communist government 
indoctrinated Hungarians with the Marxist ideal that nationality and culture are impediments to 
social progress. It therefore portrays Hungarians as victims of totalitarianism and 
internationalism, and frames Christian nationalism as the antidote to Hungary’s twentieth-
century ills.  
Chapter 2 examines two government projects during its proclaimed Holocaust Memorial 
Year of 2014: a sculpture memorializing the victims of German occupation, and a new Holocaust 
museum, “The House of Fates.” Right wing historians used the events to claim that Hungary had 
reconciled with its Jews and, by accepting the Jews into the Hungarian national community, had 
completed the “love-story” between Jews and Magyars which began with their legal 
emancipation in 1867. In doing so, the radical right’s narrative overlooked the role of Hungarian 
nationalism in ostracizing the Jewish community prior to the German invasion of 1944, which 
was a pre-condition for the horrific scale of the Hungarian Holocaust. While claiming to extend 
its welcoming hand to the contemporary Jewish community, the government neglects to confront 
the underpinnings of the interwar right which fueled anti-Semitism. 
Chapter 3 analyzes the government’s 2020 commemoration of the Treaty of Trianon’s 
centenary, in which the victorious allies of World War I divided the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
into independent nation-states and stripped the Hungarian Kingdom of much of its traditional 
lands. Fidesz interprets Trianon as evidence that Western Europe viewed and continues to view 
Hungary with colonial condescension as a territory whose borders and demography it has the 
11 
 
right to redraw. Naming 2020 the Year of National Unity, Fidesz leaders often described a 
continuity with the Trianon past by claiming to defend Hungary from Western European 
imperialism’s new manifestations: liberalism and multiculturalism. The radical right maintains 
that in the face of territorial dismemberment followed by half a century of Nazi and Soviet 
domination, Hungarian national unity must remain indestructible, and to that end Hungarians 
must take pride in their heritage and culture. The radical right pedestalizes nationalism as the 
invisible fabric which holds Hungarians together, even when they reside across borders. 
Acknowledgement of collective guilt for the Holocaust is impossible because it requires Fidesz 
to interrogate the historic cost of Hungarian nationalism.  
This thesis studies how the radical right instrumentalizes—indeed weaponizes—
historiography in service of its nationalism. In the words of Holocaust historian Timothy Snyder, 
“It is easy to sanctify policies or identities by the deaths of the victims. It is less appealing, but 
more morally urgent, to understand the actions of the perpetrators. The moral danger, after all, is 
never that one might become a victim but that one might be a perpetrator or bystander.”13 The 
radical right frames twentieth-century perpetrators as a small cadre of villainous Nazis whose 
perspectives are so unlike ours that they are only worthy of study insofar as they reveal the scale 
of Hungarian trauma. It also claims that there is an inherent danger in studying collective guilt 
for the Holocaust because it subverts national pride. By focusing on the moral evil of 
perpetrators and the purity of victims, who it construes as almost all Hungarians, the radical right 
precludes debate about the consequences of prejudice in Hungarian society today. This 
historiography manifests in policy, creating real-world consequences for the thousands of 
refugees fleeing to Europe from Middle Eastern conflicts.  
 
13 Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (New York, Basic Books, 2010), 400.  
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Chapter 1 - Terror Háza: Leftism as Terror 
In 2002 Fidesz funded Terror Háza, or “The House of Terror” museum, designed by a 
government ally and historian, Mária Schmidt, which documents and memorializes the 
Hungarian experience of totalitarianism in the twentieth century. Its building, 60 Andrassy, 
looms over the historic Andrassy Boulevard in Budapest. As the museum describes, the building 
cast a shadow in the minds of Hungarians during the fascist and communist periods, notorious as 
a base for the Arrow Cross in the interwar period, and eventually for the communist secret 
police.14 Today, a black eave etched with cutouts casts the word “Terror,” alongside the Soviet 
star and Hungarian Nazi cross onto an artificial shadow. The display preserves the building’s 
historical infamy and prevents its nineteenth-century architecture—ubiquitous along Andrassy 
Boulevard—from melting into its charming surroundings.15 Within the House of Terror visitors 
walk through dark rooms with dramatic lighting, music, and atmospheric scenery designed to 
produce a guttural response.16 
The instruments on display within the House of Terror are words and propaganda posters. 
The museum claims that physical violence is not the sole essence of terror, though there was 
plenty of that to be had during the communist years: “I never imagined that a man of 56 could be 
so severely beaten, kicked, tortured with all sorts of instruments, drugged by injections so that he 
 
14 “Reconstructed Prison Cells,” House of Terror Museum, Accessed April 22, 2021, 
https://www.terrorhaza.hu/en/allando-kiallitas/basement/reconstructed-prison-cells.  
15 The museum’s director, Maria Schmidt, writes: “We made the building reminding us of state-perpetrated crimes 
in two totalitarian regimes conspicuous in its environment by architectural means so that it become visible for all 
that this had been the house of fear. We cut the symbols of both of the dictatorships and the word ˝terror˝ into the 
wide cornice so that the sun cast a shadow forming these marks on the gray walls of the house. A shadow that once 
darkened our everyday lives.” (https://schmidtmaria.hu/eloadasok-
beszedek/v/eloadasok_the_democratization_of_kn/) 
16 Amy Sodaro, Exhibiting Atrocity: Memorial Museums and the Politics of Past Violence (New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 2018), 68.  
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could be deprived of his will-power.” However, the museum devotes the most space to the 
abstract terror of the twentieth century which laid siege to Hungarian identity:  
Whether at work or during free time, people were required to show their belief in the 
system. Before work, joint half-hour readings of the Party´s central newspaper, ‘Free 
People’ were held to deepen ideological identity… The Hungarian coat of arms was also 
modified. Instead of the Hungarian national anthem, people had to sing the Socialist 
Internationale… Those citizens who did not show enough enthusiasm risked being 
reported by the ever-present informer. Everyone learned how to whisper since they feared 
being overheard or bugged. Terror overshadowed daily life.17 
Violence, the museum claims, was only one mean of instilling Hungarians with terror. Against 
the context of 9/11, it claims that “terror” is not only the domain of Muslim extremists, but 
European politicians and bureaucrats who proclaimed the benefits of socialism. 
 
Exterior of the House of Terror.18 
 





The Museum’s Political Context 
When Viktor Orbán’s Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz) rose to power in 1998, Hungary 
was suffering economically from its transition to democratic capitalism eight years earlier. The 
center-right Magyar Democratic Forum (MDF) had governed from 1990-1994 and the 
Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) from 1994 to 1998. József Antall, the Prime Minister of the 
MDF government and his MSZP successor, Gyula Horn, were both born in 1932. By contrast, 
Viktor Orbán was born in 1963. Seeing youth as symbolic of a departure from Hungary’s past, 
the rural and largely working class Fidesz had once placed an age limit of thirty-five years on 
party membership. In its rhetoric, although Hungarians had defeated communism in 1990, 
Fidesz’s 1998 victory marked a second revolution: a new government not implicated by the 
immense wealth inequality of the post-communist 1990s would lead Hungary. László Kövér, a 
Fidesz parliamentarian has described the first free parliament in 1990 not as a revolution, but a 
“great scam.”19  
During the communist years, many Hungarians saw independence and political liberty as 
the keys to a better future. However, after the fall of Hungarian communism in 1990 the state re-
privatized industry, agriculture, and finance just as the post-communist world more generally 
was undergoing economic depression. Many of the powerful were former regime insiders who 
were well positioned in 1990 to grab state assets for themselves as they were privatized.20 
Hungarians continued to feel victimized, though their victimizers were now bankers and 
financial oligarchs rather than communist bureaucrats. The unemployment rate rose from zero to 
 
19 “House Speaker Kövér: “This opposition is not part of the Hungarian nation but a servant to that world elite,” 
Hungary Today, April 29, 2020, https://hungarytoday.hu/kover-interview-opposition-eu-third-reich/.  
20 Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes, The Light that Failed: Why the West is Losing the Fight for Democracy (New 
York: Pegasus Books, 2019), 65.  
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fourteen percent. With the ability to travel freely and access Western media, many Hungarians 
took out loans from West European banks, many in Swiss francs, to buy new houses which 
reflected Western living standards. As the Hungarian economy worsened, the Hungarian forint 
lost its value worldwide and Hungarians’ loans in foreign currencies skyrocketed relative to their 
own; countless Hungarians plummeted into debt.21 Under Antall’s leadership, many grew to 
resent the democratic capitalism they had once heralded to solve the Eastern Bloc’s problems 
and had instead brought upheaval and economic disruption.22  
Fidesz campaigned by explaining Hungary’s problems in post-communism as endemic to 
its incomplete transition. In a 2014 speech Orbán described those years: “We constantly felt that 
the weaker were stepped upon… It was always the stronger party, the bank, which dictated how 
much interest you pay on your mortgage, changing it as they liked over time.”23 As Hungarian 
sociologist András Bozóki argues, in response to the short-fallings of the previous two 
governments Fidesz asserted that citizens should advance the public good by acknowledging 
“that the government can have a creed in moral, religious and social questions.”24 In other words, 
the best way to transition from communism was not to eliminate government presence in the 
economy—thus giving free license to oligarchs—but to empower a Hungarian government that 
represented the authentic people and embraced Hungarian national identity. Bozóki concludes 
that “This ideology was the ‘spiritual revival’ of the country… Fidesz – MPP in power not only 
wanted to address first and foremost the naturally divided political community but aimed at 
 
21 Krastev and Holmes, The Light that Failed, 65-66.  
22 Krastev and Holmes, The Light that Failed, 65.  
23 Krastev and Holmes, The Light that Failed, 65.  
24 Andras Bozoki, “Consolidation or Second Revolution? The Emergence of the New Right in Hungary,” Journal of 
Communist Studies and Transition Politics 24, Issue No. 2 (April 28, 2008), 197. 
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reconstructing the cultural – moral community – according to its own values – that existed in the 
imagination of Hungarians.”25  
Viktor Orbán’s youth signified a new beginning for Hungary, and a future in which 
Hungarian civic responsibility would neither be enforced by a communist dictatorship nor 
neglected by a weak government but encouraged by young anti-elitists who were proud of 
Hungary’s national and Christian identity. Fidesz built relationships with conservative and 




The House of Terror, designed by Prime Minister Orbán’s advisor, Mária Schmidt, is a 
departure from the quaint history museums that many Americans are familiar with, characterized 
by well-lit historical artifacts and written text within glass cases. As sociologist Amy Sodaro 
points out in her book, Exhibiting Atrocity: Memorial Museums and the Politics of Past 
Violence, the House of Terror is less concerned with displaying comprehensive information than 
it is with creating a visceral and emotional experience through art and symbolism.26 It is less 
important to give a lengthy history lesson, the museum seems to say, than it is that its experience 
impact the visitor with the terror Hungarians experienced and inflicted on each other in the 
twentieth century. Merely preserving the instruments of totalitarianism—uniforms, party badges, 
old telephones etc.—seemed insufficient to convey the sensation of dread produced by the men 
 
25 Bozoki, “Consolidation or Second Revolution?” 213.  
26 Sodaro, Exhibiting Atrocity, 70.  
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who lurked in the building’s halls. Visitors to the House of Terror are greeted with black walls, 
real dungeons, and a booming soundtrack of historical political speeches. 
However, when the artifacts no longer speak for themselves, there is potential for a 
museum to express a director or politician’s historiography. Randolph L. Braham, a Holocaust 
survivor and historian has referred to Fidesz and its intellectual supporters as “history-cleansers” 
for relativizing the Holocaust to communist oppression. Indeed, the museum’s focus on the 
communist years at the expense of detail on the Holocaust implicitly conveys that communist 
trauma is more significant in Hungary’s historical narrative.  
The permanent exhibition of the House of Terror begins with the “Wall of Double 
Occupation,” which is painted black on one side and red on the other. Its design symbolizes that 
Nazism and communism are two sides of the same coin. The black side of the wall displays 
footage of Hitler’s rallies and images of concentration camps while the red side shows military 
parades outside the Kremlin in Moscow. Both display dictators with cult-like personalities 
speaking before seas of soldiers poised to invade Hungary. The exhibit also features footage of 
Germany and the USSR’s foreign ministers, Molotov, and Ribbentrop, signing the 1939 non- 
aggression pact which included secret plans to divide Poland between them.
 





The museum’s choice to compare rather than contrast fascism to Soviet communism is 
not uncommon in Eastern Europe where many argue that Nazism gets disproportionate attention 
in Western memory. While many Americans learn of the horrors of the twentieth century from a 
West European perspective, through stories such as Anne Frank, relatively few learn from school 
or film about the violence the Red Army committed against East European civilians, the 
deportations of hundreds of thousands to gulags, or the Soviets’ violent suppression of resistance 
in East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), and Czechoslovakia (1968). One of the museum’s 
main attractions is a Soviet tank—a symbol of anti-fascist resistance—sitting in a pool of oil 
before the photographs of Hungarians the Soviets murdered in 1956, reversing the narrative that 
the Red Army was Europe’s liberator.28 The museum argues that historical memory which 
portrays the Red Army as heroes of the Second World War serves to whitewash the Soviet 
Union’s own attempt to colonize Eastern Europe. From the Hungarian perspective on the 
battlegrounds of World War II, and the site of brutal occupations by both fascist and communist 
regimes, for West European liberals to intellectualize the ideologies or to take Marxism-
Leninism at its word misses the point of their overall similarities in totalitarianism and violence.  
 




Soviet Tank before wall of victims in the House of Terror.29 
  
A quote on the wall from a Hungarian left-wing politician, Imre Kovács, reads: “Last 
night I dreamt the Germans left and no one stepped in their shoes.”30 By showcasing the 
Hungarian left’s distrust of Soviet communism, the museum demonstrates that Hungarians 
almost universally rejected it. It then mirrors that theme in its description of the German invasion 
of Hungary: “We have clearly stated the date when a foreign super-power provided the 
circumstances for the creation of a totalitarian dictatorship: March 19th, 1944, the day of Nazi 
occupation, the day when Hungary lost its independence.”31 Without disagreeing with the 
museum’s assessment of fascism and communism, we should ask why it chooses to foreground 
that comparison. By emphasizing the foreign and totalitarian nature of fascism and communism, 
the museum disguises the extent to which the Hungarian government in the interwar era, and its 
radical right allies, willingly cooperated with Hitler. According to this logic, because 
 
29 https://www.terrorhaza.hu/files/lead_image/image/424/b480086e41c5c4fee392d53de56b795e.jpg. 
30 Sodaro, Exhibiting Atrocity, 70-71. 




communism and fascism are fundamentally similar—if Hungarians rejected communism, then 
they must have rejected fascism as well.  
Indeed, the museum claims that Hungary lost its sovereignty in spring 1944 with the 
German invasion which established a “puppet government” under Prime Minister Döme Sztójay. 
This description belies the fact that the Nazis allowed Hungary’s right-wing leader, Regent 
Miklós Horthy, to remain in power after the invasion, and that although under German pressure, 
he constitutionally appointed Hungary’s new fascist ministers. Leading a legally appointed 
cabinet as a familiar ruler, Regent Miklós Horthy legitimized the far right’s subsequent 
complicity in the Holocaust. As Randolph L. Braham contends: “Without the unequivocal 
support of the new, constitutionally appointed government that enjoyed the blessing of Miklós 
Horthy… the Nazis… would have been severely hampered if not helpless… With Horthy still at 
the helm and providing the symbol of national sovereignty, the Hungarian police, gendarmerie, 
and civil service collaborated with the SS in the anti-Jewish drive with a routine and efficiency 
that impressed even the Germans.”32  
 The House of Terror also ignores Hungary’s foreign policy in the 1930s and 1940s which 
led to its economic vassalage to the Third Reich. Just as Hitler’s Germany emerged from the 
Great Depression with a booming economy and miniscule unemployment by gearing its 
workforce towards armament, the Hungarian economy revitalized itself by manufacturing 
materials for the Nazi war machine. Hungary also aligned itself with Hitler’s belligerent aims by 
signing the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1939 and lending its railway infrastructure for the German 
invasion of Yugoslavia in 1941. Eventually, Hungary committed the 2nd Army to the ranks of 
 
32 Randolph L. Braham, “Assault on Historical Memory: Hungarian Nationalists and the Holocaust,” In “Hungary 
and the Holocaust: Confrontation with the Past,” (Washington DC: The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 
Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, 2001), 48.  
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Germany’s Army Group South which invaded the Soviet Union. During this period Hungary was 
indebted to Germany for its arbitration of the 2nd Vienna Award in which Romania returned 
Transylvania to Hungary. The museum never asks: if the values and governance of Horthy’s 
Hungary were so diametrically opposed to the Nazi totalitarian system, then why was Germany 
content to allow Horthy to lead Hungary after the occupation? Why was Horthy content to lead 
under the thumb of Nazi Germany without resisting? 
  
Interwar and World War II Hungary33 
Contradictions and countless what-ifs complicate 
the narrative of Hungary’s international politics in the 
1930s and 1940s. One such paradox is that Jews in nations 
allied with Nazi Germany, like Italy, Romania, and 
Bulgaria, were more likely to survive than those that 
resisted it and fell to total occupation. Before spring of 
1944, ninety-five percent of Hungary’s Jews, Hungary 
being an axis power at the time, were still alive. Meanwhile over two million Jews in Poland, 
which had resisted Nazi Germany, were dead.34 Randolph L. Braham has suggested that if the 
Miklós Kállay administration (1942-1944) had remained a vocal ally of Nazi Germany instead of 
trying to defect to the Allies, “the Jews of Hungary might possibly have survived the war 
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relatively unscathed.”35 Indeed, by trying—and failing—to negotiate with the Allies behind 
Hitler’s back Hungary provided Germany with the pretext to invade it. However, once Germany 
controlled Hungary, the government’s complicity convinced Hitler and Eichmann that they could 
carry out the Final Solution without diverting military resources from the battlefront against the 
USSR. Historians are faced with a contradiction: by showing dissent to German authority, 
Hungary invited its own occupation. Simultaneously, its apparent willingness to collaborate with 
the occupying German forces following the invasion convinced Hitler that deporting Hungary’s 
Jews to the death camps would not be a logistical debacle. So, did resistance or collaboration 
cause the large scale of the Hungarian Holocaust? At different times, they both played a role. 
Hungary’s contradictory foreign policy indicates the fractures between the indecisive 
Horthy, his moderate ministers such as Teleki and Kállay, and the Germanophile militaristic 
radical right. At varying points before March 1944 Hungarian Prime Ministers resisted German 
attempts to dominate its Jewish policy and organically passed racialized anti-Semitic legislation. 
Hungarian officials engaged in or supported the Germans in massacring Jews from occupied 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and, at other times, committed themselves to bringing those 
military leaders responsible to justice. Horthy himself vacillated between a policy of economic 
and military commitment to Germany and possible defection to the allies. To this day it is 
unclear whether Horthy hoped that abandoning Germany was a feasible option to save Hungary 
from destruction, or if he merely wanted to establish Hungary’s alibi to the Allies once the Third 
Reich was destroyed.  
Hungarian policy pre-March 1944 is a grey area in equal parts because Hungary’s leaders 
made miscalculations and because, wedged in the Carpathians, Hungary was so geographically 
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distanced from the allied armies. Historian István Deák asks how Hungary could have resisted 
Germany effectively when “arms for resisting the Germans could only have been had from 
Germany; when most of the army officers were Nazi sympathizers; and when the population 
generally expected its economic betterment from Germany?”36 While this dilemma explains why 
there was no armed resistance, it does not explain the lack of widespread civil disobedience that 
might have hindered the Germans during the spring 1944 Jewish deportations.  
Further complicating analysis of the Horthy era is that, although his leadership as regent 
was uninterrupted between 1920-1944, he did not act as a dictator; he appointed Prime Ministers 
and pushed for their dismissal but did not control them. Although there were elements of 
authoritarianism in place during Horthy’s regency, particularly for the Jews, the communist party 
was the only party that was banned and Hungarians enjoyed freedom of the press and 
independence of the courts for much of the duration of World War II.37 In an act of defiance to 
Nazi Germany, a Hungarian court convicted and sentenced several Hungarian army officers who 
were complicit in a Jewish massacre. The perpetrators were only saved by a Nazi German rescue 
operation. Furthermore, by 1944 the seventy-eight-year-old regent’s intellectual abilities were 
declining.38 Deák writes that while the Horthy regime failed, 
It is unlikely, however, that any other regime would have done better; some others in 
Hitler’s Europe did definitely worse. It should be understood that the extent of material 
and human losses suffered by European states during the war, and their postwar 
treatment, depended on luck, geography, and great power politics… Miklós Horthy 
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himself was neither better nor worse than most other military men who emerged as 
political leaders in the interwar years. He was neither a fascist nor a liberal; he was not a 
monster, but he was not a humanitarian either. He was no democrat but never tried to be a 
dictator. 
He concludes, “Like so many other statesmen of the period, Miklós Horthy might merit a little 
sympathy, but he does not deserve admiration.”39 
The Hungarian government’s openly pro-fascist foreign policy in conjunction with its 
internal anti-Semitic policies (the topic of Chapter 2) eroded its ability to resist Germany’s 
eliminationist goals by creating exceptions to the liberty and rule of law. “The 
counterrevolutionary regime of Admiral Horthy,” István Deák concludes, “had taught the 
population to discriminate against some of its fellow citizens and to take for granted the 
redistribution of property on the basis of denominational membership and race. It had also taught 
the population to accept gifts of land from another power in exchange for at least a partial 
surrender of national sovereignty.”40 The landscape of Hungary’s interwar regime is difficult to 
navigate. In its Jewish policy it was authoritarian, but it kept the nation’s media and courts free 
long after most European states had restricted them. It fought alongside Germany and Italy while 
never fully relinquishing hope of joining the allies. It supported Hitler while keeping its domestic 
fascist movements out of the government. And it supported Nazi Germany in the hopes of 
regaining territory lost from World War I. Thus, the German occupation of Hungary is far more 
complicated than merely a story about its military invasion and the imposition of a system that 
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Hungarians rejected entirely. These factors influenced how the government responded to the 
German invasion and its reasons for cooperating with the SS.  
 
The House of Terror on Totalitarianism and Christianity 
Instead of analyzing Horthy’s foreign policy and the government’s alienation of the Jews 
from civil society and the economy, the museum devotes nearly all its attention to the fringe 
Hungarian fascist party: The Arrow Cross. The “Passage of the Hungarian Nazis,” features a 
wall-to-wall engraving of a speech by Ferenc Szálasi, the Hungarian fascist leader, which he 
gave soon after the October 16, 1944 putsch that toppled the Horthy regime and brought the 
fascist Arrow Cross to power for three months.41 In the next room a uniformed mannequin, the 
“ghostly figure of Ferenc Szálasi,” stands at the head of a table while Hungarian fascist and 
German SS uniforms line the walls.42 
 
Room of the Hungarian Nazis.43 
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Monitors show footage of ice floating down a river, evoking the winter 1944-45 massacres in 
which Hungarian fascists massacred Budapest Jews on the bank of the Danube. Although an 
event worth mentioning in any museum about the Hungarian Holocaust, its placement as one of 
the permanent exhibition’s first displays creates the impression that the persecution of Jews was 
entirely the action of German and Hungarian Nazis. By foregrounding the Arrow Cross, the 
museum argues that Hungarian Nazis, although few in number, were the primary agents of terror 
in 1944-1945, even though most of the Hungarian Jews who died were killed during Horthy’s 
leadership.  
The museum then adds detail to its comparison between Nazism and communism: “On 
the basis of collective criteria, these totalitarian dictatorships persecuted and killed those who 
they ruled under their might. However, religion… approached the question of sin and 
forgiveness on the basis of personal responsibility. The Nazis and the Communists replaced God 
with their leaders and claimed that it was they who were omniscient and infallible.”44 With its 
mention of “personal responsibility” the museum portrays a totalitarian worldview which is the 
opposite of the Christian worldview. Because the House of Terror sees a high traffic of young 
people and tourists—not just highly educated Hungarians—it mobilizes a visitor’s prior 
knowledge about Nazism to fill in the gaps of their understanding of communism.  
The museum’s framing of European fascism as universally atheistic is also inaccurate: 
Ferenc Szálasi of the Arrow Cross considered himself a devoted Christian and added racial 
elements to Christian anti-Semitic stereotypes that the mainstream Hungarian right already 
 




embraced.45 Szálasi once wrote that it was the duty of every Magyar Priest to be “the priest and 
brother of every Magyar and, according to the commands of his faith, should bring his Magyar 
brothers closer to God…”46 As Paul Hanebrink argues, “Like many adherents of national 
socialism in Germany, Hungary's fascists easily blended Christian symbolism and visions of 
blood and race.”47 Although many fascists built cults of personality around their leaders, some 
even claiming to be infallible, it is too large a leap that this necessarily entailed the persecution 
of the Churches. To do this is to take Hitler’s specific anti-Christian version of fascism and 
project it onto East European fascist movements which had completely different views of 
Christianity. 
By focusing on Nazi and communist persecution of Hungary’s churches, the House of 
Terror portrays Hungarian Christianity as the antithesis of foreign totalitarianism: The Nazis and 
the Communists “announced that a new type of man was needed to create a new world and a 
paradise on Earth, thus, they had the right to destroy anything or anyone who stood in the way of 
their highest goal.”48 It adds: “The Communist dictatorship that was laid down in the footsteps of 
the Soviet invaders considered churches as enemies from the very beginning and a target for 
destruction due to their moral and spiritual respect in addition to financial power and 
internationally organized structure.”49 It is logical that the Soviets attacked churches in Hungary 
because of their wealth and because they anchored Hungarians to institutions which persisted in 
democratic Western Europe. It is also true that Marxism, the state ideology of the Soviet Union, 
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perceived organized religion as part of the superstructure that held up the unequal system of 
industrial capitalism. The museum, however, embeds in these verifiable claims the clause that 
the Soviets targeted Christian institutions because they were moral and spiritual authorities. 
Rather than understanding the causal relationship between organized Hungarian Christianity, the 
nationalist government, and anti-Semitism, the museum decouples religion from authoritarianism 
and frames it as a rallying point of Hungarian resistance to foreign invaders.  
The House of Terror expands on this theme in the Room of Churches, which displays a 
blaring white crucifix on the floor symbolizing how totalitarians attempted to stamp Hungarian 
Christianity into the ground. The room’s central historical artefact is the cape of Archbishop 
Mindszenty who led the Hungarian Catholic Church in the immediate post-war years, having 
been a vocal opponent of fascism and communism. The museum’s website describes the contrast 
between these Christian relics and the ideological “hate speech” blaring from its speakers: the 
room contains “Mindszenty’s cape and the relics of religious orders which have been trampled 
upon [to] symbolize the war of materialism with religion, inhumanity with humanity.”50 
Materialism is inhumanity and religion is humanity. This statement embodies the museum’s 
thesis that we should see Hungary’s twentieth century as a conflict between foreign totalitarian 
and materialistic ideologies and Hungarian Christian nationalism.  
The museum acknowledges that some Hungarians willingly sided with these foreign 
dictatorships by exploring Ferenc Szálasi and the Arrow Cross in detail. However, in its room of 
“Changing Clothes” the museum emphasizes that in 1945, the Hungarian communist movement 
was so small that it scoured Arrow Cross membership records it had captured and recruited the 
 




former fascists into the Communist Party.51 Thus the museum’s focus on the Arrow Cross serves 
two purposes beyond merely acknowledging the existence of Hungarian Nazis: 1) It allows the 
museum to exaggerate the scarcity of extremists in interwar Hungary and 2) it supports the 
museum’s argument that fascism and communism are more alike than different. After all, how 
different could they really be if fascists were willing to serve in the Communist Party? 
 
 
Communism and the House of Terror 
 
 “Our ancestors learned that the essence of communist rule is impassioned anti-Christianity, a fierce hatred 
for the nation paired with eager internationalism, artificial mass indoctrination that comes with a conscious 
destruction of communities as well as the economic robbery of people concealed by deceitful philanthropic 
buzzwords.”52 
- Hungarian House Speaker, László Kövér 
 The House of Terror continues its comparison between Nazism and communism in its 
room on Hungarian churches: “While the Nazis declared war based on race, the Communists 
declared war based on the classes. Both, however, regarded religion as an enemy.”53 The 
description’s use of “Communists” does not specify Stalinism, which the Red Army brought to 
Hungary by force in 1945, the liberal communism of Imre Nagy, or the “Goulash communism” 
of János Kádár in the post-1956 era. Thus, it frames East-European communism as a monolithic 
and represented by 1940s Stalinism.  
During the late 1940s, Stalin implemented communism at the highest executive level atop 
a Hungarian Parliament and, indeed, a nation where communism held little sway. When the 
communist executive nationalized Hungary’s education system, the Catholic Cardinal 
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Mindszenty began to excommunicate governmental officers who cooperated with the program.54 
With Hungary seemingly spinning out of control in 1948-1949, Stalin clamped down by banning 
opposition parties and purging the bureaucracy of non-communists, as well as the clergy of 
opposition figures, leading to several years of hardline Stalinist rule.55  
The death of Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev’s ascendence to General Secretary of the 
Soviet Union, which coincided with the worsening economic fallout of ham-fisted 
collectivization across Eastern Europe, helped to create the conditions for Hungary’s 1956 
revolution. In 1955-1956 Khrushchev publicly denounced Stalin’s oppressive style of 
governance which for Hungarians only served to underscore the injustice of being led by the 
Stalinist Mátyás Rákosi. To prevent a political crisis the Soviets ordered Rákosi to resign but, 
rather than replacing him with the popular Imre Nagy, chose another hardliner named Ernő 
Gerő.56 In October of 1956 the Soviet Union returned the popular reformer Władysław Gomułka 
to power in Hungary’s neighbor, Poland. Foreseeing similar changes in Hungary, Budapest 
college students gathered by the thousands on October 23, 1956 to demand leadership under the 
liberal-communist Imre Nagy. They also demanded the punishment of Stalinist oppressors, 
freedom of speech, and freedom of the press.57 After initial police violence, the educated and the 
lower classes became unified in their outrage at the brutality of the security forces and soon 
thousands of people from all social backgrounds gathered on the streets of Budapest. Nagy then 
proclaimed that under his leadership, Hungary would no longer be a Soviet satellite state.58 
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Although Nagy emerged merely as an anti-Stalinist, which Khrushchev was not necessarily 
opposed to, he became disillusioned with the very idea that Hungary’s journey to socialism was 
best served beneath the thumb of the Soviet Union.  
Nagy announced that under his leadership Hungary would withdraw from the Warsaw 
Pact (the Soviet Bloc’s NATO) and that Hungary would become a neutral country in the Cold 
War.59 On November 4 the Soviets and neighboring Warsaw Pact nations invaded Hungary and 
crushed the revolution militarily. The crackdown killed roughly 2,500 Hungarians and, in 1958, 
the counter-revolutionary government under János Kádár tried and executed Nagy. Through one 
lens, we can see that the Hungarian Revolution was the result of a combination of the Hungarian 
government’s authoritarianism and the political missteps of Khrushchev who promised de-
Stalinization but was unwilling to upset the communist system in Hungary. When the 
Hungarians fought to make the change themselves, Khrushchev saw the revolution has a blight 
to the Soviets’ political prestige and as a risk to the strategic security of the Eastern Bloc. 
 
March of Hungarian protestors, October 25, 1956.60 
 






In Hungarian public memory, however, 1956 is not a story about politics but another 
example of Hungary’s national identity being suppressed by Russians for asserting itself. Indeed, 
it was with the help of a Russian army that the Habsburg monarchy crushed the Hungarian 
Revolution of 1848. Commemorating the 1956 revolution in a 2018 speech, Mária Schmidt 
reminisced: “What happened to us then here in Hungary still provides hope and strength today. 
Hundreds of thousands of people stood hand-in-hand on the main squares of our cities; hundreds 
of thousands of total strangers hugged each other. There were those who shed tears of joy, 
because the communal heartbeat of the nation was so strong that it was sensed even by those 
who did not want to sense it.”61 Beyond politics, in Hungarian memory 1956 signified that in the 
face of adversity, indeed a force of over two thousand Soviet tanks, they would not allow their 
unique culture and identity to be swept from the map of Europe and incorporated into a Soviet-
communist empire.  
 Ironically, Viktor Orbán rose to fame in the 1980s by extolling the Hungarian 1956 
revolutionary, Imre Nagy, who was himself a communist. Thus, the museum exemplifies a shift 
in the attitudes of Fidesz and its loyalists to Hungary’s 1956 heroes. While the museum mentions 
Nagy briefly in its room on “Justice” under authoritarian communism, it focuses more on the 
violence and terror of the regime’s reprisals against the revolutionaries rather than the 
revolutionaries’ beliefs. Indeed, the “Resistance” room makes little mention of the liberal-
minded communist resistance to Stalinism, but instead devotes itself largely to resistance by 
military officers, such as the Community of Fellow Hungarian Fighters (MBHK) and the Colonel 
Pál Hadváry group.  
 
61 “Director-General Mária Schmidt’s speech on the 62nd anniversary of the 1956 Revolution and Freedom Fight,” 






To clarify, I am not criticizing the museum for comparing Nazism to Soviet communism, 
or for giving attention to the horrific crimes that communists committed against non-Jewish 
Hungarians. Double Occupation posed Hungarians with unique horrors and challenges. Timothy 
Snyder wrote of the civilian experience on the Eastern Front of World War II: “A single 
occupation can fracture a society for generations; double occupation is even more painful and 
divisive… The departure of one foreign ruler meant nothing more than the arrival of another… 
They had to deal with the consequences of their own previous commitments under one occupier 
when the next one came…”62 While Snyder was describing the Western USSR in 1941, his 
description can also apply to Hungary in 1944-1945. The trap of double occupation presented the 
Hungarian government with a scenario in which there was no way out, only ways forward that in 
hindsight may have been less horrific than the one Horthy and his ministers chose. The story of 
Hungarians tyrannized under communism is worth telling. 
However, by purporting to be a museum devoted broadly to the experience of “terror,” 
the museum obligates itself to be comprehensive to an extent. Indeed, it describes itself as 
neither a Holocaust nor Stalinism museum, but a memorial to the experience of terror in Hungary 
more broadly. However, the minimal space which the House of Terror allocates to Nazi death 
camps as opposed to Soviet gulags is striking. In the English translation of the text in the room of 
Double Occupation, the museum devotes eighty-seven words to the spring and summer 1944 
Jewish deportations. It spends an additional thirty-one words on the topic in the Passage of the 
Hungarian Nazis. By contrast, the museum’s room on gulags devotes five-hundred-sixty-four 
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words to the fate of Hungarians who the communists imprisoned and deported. The museum’s 
room, “Resettlement and Deportation,” spends another six-hundred-fifty-six words on the 
subject. This discrepancy begs the question of whether we should approach the House of Terror 
as a Holocaust museum, or if in the 2002 political moment the government merely saw the 
Holocaust as useful to contextualize and influence its depiction of communism.  
How does the House of Terror contribute to the radical right’s framing of liberalism in 
post-communist Europe? “Terror” means the same thing in English and Hungarian. Therefore, 
the museum’s logo, with the title of the museum written in Hungarian, reads, “Terror Háza.” 
The word “terror” also appears in the Hungarian name for the Red Terror of the short-lived 
Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919, “vörösterror.” So, what does “terror” mean to the museum’s 
director, Mária Schmidt? In addition to using the word to describe acts of political violence by 
Muslim extremists, Schmidt has described attacks on the East European right by West European 
liberals as a form of “intellectual terrorism.” By this she means that “Not one segment of our 
lives is being spared. Hatred bombs are being thrown at our faith, while a frontal offensive has 
been launched against our system of values. Nation states and Christianity are in the 
crosshairs.”63 According to Schmidt the terrorizers of the Christian world in the twenty-first 
century are not only mass murderers from Saudi Arabia or Afghanistan, but leftists sheltering in 
ivory towers in Brussels and Berlin.  
Although Schmidt wrote this piece in 2017, fifteen years after the museum’s 
inauguration, it sheds light on her conception of terrorism: it is not merely political violence. In 
communist Hungary and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the government cowed 
 




millions into submission with the threat of exposure as a dissident, disenfranchisement, and 
social alienation and ignominy. In the radical right’s ideology, the “Goulash communism” of 
János Kádár and “Real existing Socialism” of Erich Honecker’s GDR terrorized the people by 
indoctrinating them into believing that national identity held no spiritual bond, and therefore no 
value in the international socialist utopia. They terrorized their citizens by ceaselessly repeating 
that Hungarians’ unique cultures and traditions, as well as their borders were obstacles to be 
overcome. According to Schmidt and Fidesz, that threat is still out there. In this way, the House 
of Terror is highly political. It serves as a monument to the Fidesz regime: the first Hungarian 
government since the Kingdom of Hungary under Horthy’s regency to name the spiritual unity of 
ethnic Hungarians as its goal, and a pre-condition for good Hungarian government. In the 
following chapter I discuss Fidesz’s Holocaust commemoration events in 2014, but first I fill in 
































  Democratic Coalition: 9 seats   MSZP-Dialogue: 20 seats   Politics Can Be Different: 8 
seats   Together 2014: 1 seat   German minority: 1 seat   Others Independent: 1 seat   Fidesz-KDNP: 
133 seats   Jobbik: 26 seats64 
 
 The above image represents the distribution of the Hungarian National Assembly 
between 2018-2022. With Fidesz holding two thirds of the seats and the historically extreme-
right Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary) holding an additional twenty-six, the absence of a 
center-right is striking considering that the MDF under József Antall emerged as the most 
popular party in Hungary after the fall of communism.  
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 Throughout the 2000s Fidesz grew increasingly populistic, arguing that the left-wing 
MSZP government was communist-era economic malpractice incarnate. On 17 September 2006, 
a political “nuclear bomb” exploded in Hungary when internet users broadcast a secretly 
recorded speech by left-wing Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány to his MSZP party members.65 
The Prime Minister excoriated his bloc: “We had almost no other choice [than the package of 
cuts] because we fucked up. Not just a little bit but totally... Obviously, we have been lying our 
heads off for the last one-and-a-half, two years.”66 He then turned to his party’s failure to cope 
with Fidesz: “I’ve only been able to keep going the last one-and-a-half years because one thing 
has spurred me on: to give back to the left the belief that it could accomplish something and win! 
That you don’t have to bow your head in this motherfucking country. That you don’t have to shit 
yourself when you go face-to-face with Viktor Orbán and the right…”67 To this day we do not 
know how the speech was leaked.  
 Its viral spread was catastrophic for the left. Viktor Orbán declared that “For the first time 
since 1989 Hungary has become the victim of an open, organized political lie.”68 Thousands of 
protestors descended on the Parliament building and Kossuth Square to protest the MSZP’s 
leadership, chanting “Gyurcsány must go!”69 Viktor Orbán declared the protests a plebiscite on 
the government and the opposition won overwhelmingly in the municipal elections of that fall.70 
Police officers clashed violently against protestors on the symbolic day of October 23, 2006, the 
fiftieth anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution. Orbán successfully framed Fidesz as the 
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leaders of a desperately needed opposition, a claim which would only be bolstered when the 
Financial Crisis came to Europe.  
 What of the center right MDF? There were many factors that led to the fracturing of the 
old center right. Perhaps the most important reasons were its failure to regain power from the left 
in the 2000s and the increasing faith of center-right Parliamentarians that the more radical Fidesz 
held the answer to the left’s electoral strength. Indeed, in the 2000s Fidesz had yet to embrace 
Islamophobia and authoritarianism, and instead juxtaposed its relatively clean record against the 
allegations of cronyism and corruption that haunted the MSZP. In a speech from that era, Orbán 
declared his intention to form a “central political forcefield” that would advance conservative 
policies while safely locking the left out of government.71 In short, the center right did not 
disappear or get voted out of existence. Rather, it pooled its resources together under Fidesz and 
has radicalized within it. 
 In 2021 Fidesz holds two thirds (133) of Hungary’s 199 Parliamentary seats. Its greatest 
rival is Jobbik (26 seats), followed by the MSZP (20 seats), the Democratic Coalition, a 
breakaway left-wing party founded by former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány (9 seats), and 
Politics Can be Different, Hungary’s green party (8 seats). Because the opposition parties are 
polarized on the left and right it is difficult for them to cooperate. The opposition continues to 
lack a center right party because Fidesz has thus far been successful in marketing itself as radical 
and conservative simultaneously, thereby monopolizing a wide breadth of the political spectrum. 
Indeed, while Fidesz’s radicalism generates the most headlines internationally, much of its 
legislation is essentially conservative.  
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Chapter 2 – The Hungarian Holocaust: Forgetting by Remembering? 
 In 2014 the Hungarian Holocaust Memorial Center received a package from a man the 
government likely despised. It contained the Medium Cross of the Order of the Republic of 
Hungary, the nation’s highest honor, and a letter requesting that the name Randolph L. Braham, 
be stricken from its Library and Information Center. The letter was signed: “Randolph L. 
Braham Graduate Center of the City University of New York.”72  
 Professor Braham was a Hungarian Jew and survivor of the Jewish Labor Service 
Battalions on the Eastern Front of World War II. After the war he moved to the U.S where he 
published his 1981 history of the Hungarian Holocaust: The Politics of Genocide. Braham’s 
piece on the Labor Service System is one of the most horrific. Braham points out that the 
blueprint for the Jewish battalions and their legal justification dates to Admiral Horthy’s seizure 
of Budapest in 1920 and the subsequent White Terror against Hungarian communists and Jews.73 
After the German invasion of the USSR in 1941, Hungarian-Jewish laborers conscripted into the 
system chipped out fortifications in the frozen Ukrainian soil. In the spring they tugged horse-
carts through mud and cleared mine fields.74 The contemporary right’s historical narrative holds 
the Horthy regency and its policies far apart from the Holocaust. Today, a recreation of the 
Horthy-era Monument to the Victims of the Red Terror stands in Budapest, despite the role of 
Red Terror mythology in fomenting the subsequent White Terror in which nationalist forces 
purged Hungarian Jews and leftists.  
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Retelling the story of the Holocaust in Hungary is important because after 1945 the 
nation had no time to come to terms with it; Soviet and Hungarian communists instead banished 
the Holocaust to the “Orwellian black hole of history.”75 In the Soviet narrative, the Nazis had 
not invaded Eastern Europe to eliminate Europe’s Jews but to destroy the socialist worker’s 
utopia. In this narrative, the primary victims were not Jews but Soviet and Hungarian communist 
martyrs. In 2014 Professor Braham’s fight for recognition of the Hungarian Holocaust seemed to 
have triumphed when Fidesz announced a year of Holocaust remembrance on the seventieth 
anniversary of the German occupation of Hungary. After reading the government’s plan 
Professor Braham returned his Medium Cross in protest. The historians behind the year’s events 
framed it as a conclusion of a centuries-old story of the Hungarian struggle against outside forces 
to accept Hungarian Jews into the Hungarian national community. The resounding emotions 
would be loss, but also acceptance and conclusion as Hungarians supposedly triumphed over the 
divisiveness of Nazism and completed Hungary’s nationalistic arc in its demonstration of 
solidarity between Hungarian Jews and Christians.  
While this final element seems unobjectionable, it shifts blame for the Holocaust entirely 
onto Nazism and precludes discussion about the role of mainstream Hungarian nationalism in the 
Hungarian Holocaust. Paradoxically, insomuch as governments invest in museums and 
monuments to preserve memory, their existence risks lulling a nation into believing that its 
memory work is complete.  
 
 




The Holocaust Memorial Year of 2014 
In 2014, the seventieth anniversary of the Hungarian Holocaust, the government 
announced a monument to “The Victims of German Occupation” and a new museum called “The 
House of Fates.” The Monument to the Victims of German Occupation, which stands in 
Budapest’s Liberty Square, has generated criticism for transferring blame for the Holocaust 
entirely onto the German occupiers and, in the spirit of national unity and reconciliation, not 
distinguishing between Jewish and Christian Hungarians who died following the occupation. The 
sculpture depicts a raptor with a band around one claw reading 1944, swooping menacingly 
towards the archangel Gabriel who clings to the crown of St. Stephen, a symbol of Hungarian 
national sovereignty. The statue illustrates that Hungary lost its sovereignty entirely in 1944 
because the German eagle pried it from its grasp. By depicting the archangel Gabriel rather than 
a Jewish symbol the memorial casts the German occupation as a Hungarian national tragedy, 
rather than a Jewish tragedy. A counter monument sits across from it which specifically 
memorializes Hungary’s murdered Jews. Fidesz had announced the second event in 2013, a 
museum directed by Mária Schmidt titled the “House of Fates.” Unlike the House of Terror, the 
House of Fates was to be entirely devoted to Holocaust history and would focus on the stories of 
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Jewish children deported by rail to Auschwitz. 
 
Monument to the Victims of German Occupation in Budapest’s Liberty Square.76 
Why did Fidesz so suddenly foreground the Holocaust in Hungary’s historical narrative, 
and thereby call attention to one of the most controversial and seemingly damning periods in its 
history? There are two currents in Hungarian politics that may be related. The first is its use as a 
mechanism for its “anti-anti-Semitism.” By expressing support for the Jewish community 
through Holocaust remembrance, the government could openly condemn anti-Semitism while 
appropriating anti-Semitic stereotypes to frame its politics. As Ivan Kalmar points out, “One of 
the aspects of anti-anti-Semitism is that it may reverse ‘the dictums of anti-Semitism without 







anti-anti-Semites seek to resist.”77 In response to any accusations of anti-Semitism the 
government could point to its multitude of museums and memorials which educate people about 
the Holocaust as evidence otherwise. Simultaneously, government backed newspapers and 
advertising agencies could plaster the walls of public transportation with a grinning George 
Soros conspiring Hungary’s demise.  
For the Hungarian radical right, George Soros cuts a similar figure to the American 
right’s portrayal of Hillary Clinton during Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign as a 
member of “the swamp.” Just as the American right attacked Clinton as a member of the coastal 
and urban elite, which is cosmopolitan and sacrifices the wellbeing of authentic Americans to 
overseas interests, Fidesz accuses George Soros of planning to tear down Europe’s borders by 
undermining national solidarity and flooding the continent with Muslim migrants. Orbán has 
termed this conspiracy the “Soros Plan.”78 According to Mária Schmidt, George Soros will use 
the liberal elites’ delusions of an open-borders utopia to expand his “philanthropic” media 
empire. Once Soros controls the politicians, intellectuals, and media in a country, so the 
argument goes, he will be free to exploit the country’s financial resources.79 Until 2014 Fidesz 
could have denied charges of anti-Semitism by pointing to the government’s highest award 
sitting in Professor Braham’s office. 
Another reason for the government’s focus on the Holocaust is, as Mónika Kovács 
describes, “The Holocaust became a global icon and a symbol of radical evil and recognizing it 
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as such appeared to Central European societies as a moral obligation and a condition for 
accession to Europe. Either freely or due to Western pressure, they realized that ‘if a nation 
actively participates in the community of Holocaust remembrance, its moral standing will 
improve at the international level.”80 Memorializing the Holocaust demonstrates that a nation has 
come to terms with its past by no longer downplaying its scale or significance. However, by 
framing the Hungarian Holocaust as entirely the work of German Nazis, beyond influence by 
Hungarians themselves—in a word, fated—the radical right can claim to cleanse the national 
conscience of collective guilt and reassure people that its nationalistic policies in the twenty-first 
century in no way reflect interwar policies which influenced the Holocaust.  
Before analyzing the nationalist narrative in-depth, it is necessary to explain the 
chronology of the Hungarian Holocaust and the pre-conditions for its brutality that Hungarians 
laid down before the German occupation of 1944. By detailing Hungarian anti-Semitism before 
1944, and the role it played in isolating Hungarian Jews, we can analyze how the radical right’s 
near-exclusive focus on 1944 neglects some of the most important causal elements of the story. 
 
Historical Context81 
The radical right’s historiography fails to interrogate why Hungary was different from 
other fascist or occupied nations that succeeded in protecting significant numbers of their Jews 
such as Italy, Denmark, and Bulgaria. In part, the answer lies in the politics of the Second World 
 
80 Mónika Kovács, “Global and Local Holocaust Remembrance,” In The Holocaust in Hungary: Seventy Years Later 
ed. Randolph L. Braham and András Kovács (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2016), 
232.  
81 After the bibliography, see Appendix 1 for a detailed timeline of the Hungarian Holocaust. See Appendix 2 for 




War: in Hungary, the Nazis did not fear igniting rebellion because for much of the spring of 1944 
the Jewish deportations occurred under the auspices of the constitutional Hungarian government. 
While the Wehrmacht invaded Hungary in force, Adolf Eichmann arrived in Hungary with no 
more than three hundred German authorities to transport over 400,000 Jews to Auschwitz.82 
Edmund Veesenmayer, the SS-Brigadeführer who oversaw occupied Hungary wrote that 
Hungarian authorities carried out the deportations in a praiseworthy fashion.83 According to 
András Kovács, the Nazis carried out the deportations with the assistance of around 200,000 
members of the Hungarian government: “In addition to the gendarmerie, the required 
collaborators included a wide range of state employees from the staff of county orphan agencies 
to female body-friskers.”84  
The radical right’s historiography alleviates responsibility for the Holocaust from the 
shoulders of ordinary Hungarians and the Christian-nationalist leaders of the Horthy regency. 
While it is debatable that Horthy knew for certain before summer of 1944 that the Nazis were 
sending his citizens to gas chambers, the fact remains that Hitler had expressed his eliminationist 
anti-Semitism in the past to Horthy.85 In 1941, Hungarian troops annexed Carpathian Ruthenia 
from former Czechoslovakia and deported its Jews to Soviet Ukraine, directly into the path of 
German Army Group South and the Einsatzgruppen. Hungarians witnessed the Germans 
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massacre 18,000 of these Jews in Kaminets Podolsk. If Horthy remained ignorant in 1944 it was 
willfully.86  
The story of the Hungarian Holocaust begins, at the latest, with the end of World War I. 
The democratic government of the Aster Revolution, which had overthrown the Habsburgs in 
1918, had fallen to a communist coup in March of 1919. Besieged by a Romanian army and the 
counter-revolutionary Hungarian White Army, the new Hungarian Soviet Republic collapsed in 
August of that same year, leaving control of a now truncated Hungary to an un-sturdy coalition 
of conservative aristocratic politicians and radical rightists. Amidst the chaos of civil war, the 
counter revolutionaries unleashed the White Terror which targeted and murdered Jews for their 
alleged support of communism. The new government decided against instating the former 
Habsburg monarch, Charles I, leaving Horthy as the de-facto head of state. Many of the policies 
of Hungary’s conservative Prime-Ministers who ruled under the regency of Admiral Miklós 
Horthy, a conservative aristocrat, can be seen through the lens of its tension with the radical 
right.  
The conservatives’ political promise was to restore Hungary to normalcy through a 
functioning government and rule of law. This promise included the legal protection of Jews 
(indeed in Germany, a problem for Hitler was that thuggish anti-Semitism appeared to 
undermine the orderly Nazi state). However, for many Hungarians any return to normalcy 
required that Hungary recapture the territory the Entente had taken from it after World War I, 
through military force if necessary. The militarist radical right staked its claim to this goal and in 
doing so undercut the conservative aristocratic right. While Horthy and his conservative Prime 
Minister, Count István Bethlen, could not retrieve Transylvania in the 1920s, they could appease 
 
86 Braham, The Politics of Genocide, 205. 
47 
 
the militarist right by discriminating against Hungary’s Jews. In 1920 Hungary passed the 
Numerus Clausus law which limited Jewish participation in higher education to six percent. The 
law stemmed from the common perception that Hungary’s Jews had infiltrated its intelligentsia 
and bourgeois, taking positions that should be held by Hungarians. The date of 1920 is key 
because it contradicts the notion that Hungarian anti-Semitism relied on Adolf Hitler. In 1920, 
Germany was a democracy and Hitler was largely unknown; he would not become the German 
chancellor until 1933. Horthy once wrote a letter to Hitler boasting that anti-Semitism ranked as 
an official state policy and that Hitler should not presume to lecture Hungarians about how to 
solve the Jewish problem.87 
The radical right also applied pressure on the government to revise the Treaty of Trianon. 
In addition to breaking up imperial holdings in Eastern Europe, France had hoped to empower 
Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia as buffers against the encroaching Soviet Union, at 
the expense of Hungarian territory. However, the Hungarian radical right was convinced that 
Trianon reflected the work of a foreign Judeo-Bolshevik spirit, and that only through its 
extirpation from Hungarian political, economic, and intellectual life could Hungary regain its 
former status as a regional power. To appease the radical right, the Hungarian state approved 
restrictions of Jewish participation in finance, the intelligentsia, and skilled professions. Between 
1932 and 1942 Regent Horthy appointed four different radical right and openly anti-Semitic 
Prime Ministers: Gyula Gömbös (1932-1936), Kálmán Darányi (1936-1938), Béla Imrédy 
(1938-1939), and László Bárdossy (1941-1942). These leaders pursued increasingly pro-German 
foreign policy, exporting raw materials to the Nazi war-machine, and eventually committing the 
 




Hungarian Second Army to fight alongside Germany on the Eastern Front. In Ukraine, 
Hungarian soldiers witnessed firsthand the Germans’ attempted genocide of Jews and Slavs.  
In partaking of Hitler’s spoils—by 1941 Hungary occupied Transylvania and portions of 
Yugoslavia—Hungary ingratiated itself to Nazi Germany while making itself economically 
dependent. Long before Germany invaded it in 1944, Hungary had begun to cede its 
independence piecemeal. With a closer relationship to Nazi Germany came greater pressure to 
conform to Hitler’s violent anti-Semitism. In his book, The Jews in Hungary, Gyula Gömbös 
claimed “The thesis is simple: the Jews must not be allowed to succeed in any field beyond the 
level of their ratio in the population.”88 In 1934, now Hungary’s Prime Minister, Gömbös signed 
the German-Hungarian Economic Agreement, in which Hungary exported grain, livestock, and 
most of its bauxite in return for German imports of industrial goods and raw materials.89 Despite 
this worrying erosion of independence, many Hungarians supported the partnership because the 
jolt to industrial production increased employment.90 While German agents made inroads into 
institutions such as the Hungarian gendarmerie and General Staff under the smokescreen of 
economic cooperation, Gömbös himself increased government funding of anti-Semitic 
newspapers.91                                                                                                                
In 1938, Prime Minister Darányi announced his support for a popular memorandum 
backed by Germanophile officers and right-wingers in the civilian government, Béla Imrédy 
among them, that described the Jewish “problem” as a dire threat to Hungary’s pro-Nazi 
armament. On March 5 Darányi announced the Győr plan before the nation: “The planned and 
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legal solution of the [Jewish] question is the basic condition for the establishment of a just 
situation—a just situation that will either correct or eliminate the aforementioned social 
disproportions and will diminish Jewry’s influence in the nation’s cultural life and other fields to 
its proper level.”92 On May 28 Darányi and Imrédy pushed their anti-Semitic law through 
Parliament which introduced a limit of twenty percent Jewish participation in financial and 
industrial enterprises.93 Although Hungarian liberals publicly protested the legislation, their 
voices were overruled when Hungary’s Christian leaders, including Bishop Sándor Raffay of the 
Lutheran Church and Bishop László Ravasz of the Calvinist Church favored the bill, arguing that 
it would quell frustration about Jewish overrepresentation.94 Hungary’s second broad anti-
Semitic bill was adopted on May 4, 1939, which defined Jewishness on racial grounds by 
documenting family history. The laws prohibited Jews from holding any government positions 
and from working as teachers or editors in periodicals, and it planned to withdraw licenses from 
Jewish businesses until they drastically lowered the number of Jews they employed.95                          
 The anti-Semitic laws solidified and popularized the right’s view that Jews were not 
Hungarians of a different faith, but a different racial community altogether: that they were 
imposters who had lived amongst Hungarians all while supporting the Bolsheviks and conspiring 
to control Hungary in secret. The imperative that the laws placed on carving Jews out of 
Hungarian society reveals the extent of their prior assimilation—Hungarian Jews were 
Hungarians, and it took decades of government legislation, and the tolerance of radical-right 
prejudice by the conservative establishment to isolate and pauperize the Jewish community. For 
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the Jews to appear separate from the Hungarian Christian community in 1944 was a pre-
condition for the speed and ferocity of the Hungarian Holocaust.                                                                                              
      Within three weeks of the German invasion of Hungary in March 1944, Interior Minister 
László Endre, under Prime Minister Döme Sztójay, began preparing to ghettoize the Hungarian 
Jewish community of the now heavily bombed Budapest. It ordered the municipal office to take 
inventory of Jewish residences and published its findings in the anti-Semitic press, emphasizing 
that the Jews who constituted twenty percent of the population occupied 47,978 rooms while the 
rest of the population occupied only 70,197 rooms.96 The German Nazi Otto Winkelman testified 
at the post-war trial of the Hungarian collaborators, Endre, Jaross, and Baky, that Germany was 
unlikely to have carried out its anti-Semitic policy in Hungary if the Hungarian government had 
opposed it. While certainly a questionable source, Winkelman explained it with the German 
strategic imperative on the Eastern Front of maintaining Hungarian cooperation.97 
 Although Budapest’s Jewish community was spared in the summer of 1944 by Regent 
Horthy, Hungary’s rural Jews were largely annihilated: roughly eighty percent of the 434,351 
Jews led onto train cars by Hungarian gendarmes to Auschwitz died between May 15 and July 8, 
1944.98 In Germany, historian Karl Schleunes wrote of a “Twisted Road to Auschwitz,” 
cautioning against using the eventual “Final Solution” to assume that the Holocaust’s 
perpetrators had possessed a “master plan” from the beginning.99 Similarly, in Hungary scholars 
have debated whether one can draw a straight line of intention from the first anti-Jewish laws in 
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1920 to the genocide of 1944. One consensus is that, though the line is not straight, it is still 
there. While some scholars downplay the significance of the Numerus Clausus, pointing out that 
its limitations on Jewish freedom were mild, Mária Kovács explains that it elevated the Jewish 
Question—a mere conspiracy theory until 1920—to the plain of government recognition and 
action.100 She then responds to the notion that Hungary’s renewed anti-Semitic policy in 1938 
reflected only German pressure by quoting Pál Teleki, a Prime Minister most famous for 
resisting Germany’s attempts to dominate Hungary. Speaking before the Upper House of 
Parliament in 1928—five years before Hitler rose to power in Germany—Teleki declared, “We 
must see sincerely and clearly… that… we are in the midst of a war of races… Full equality [for 
the Jews] would create an impossible situation.”101  
 In Hungarian Holocaust survivor Imre Kertész’ novel, Fatelessness, Hungarian Jews 
awaiting deportation to Auschwitz took orders not from a Nazi barking out commands, but an 
amiable and slightly anxious policeman. As the day wore on and the policeman awaited 
instructions, “He urged us to make ourselves comfortable. He even asked if we knew any party 
games… For a while he swapped jokes with us, though meanwhile I had the feeling that he was 
striving at all costs to keep us amused somehow.”102 While Kertsz’ policeman likely did not see 
himself as a murderer, he participated in genocide. As Hannah Arendt reminds us in her book, 
Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, we should not mistake a lack of 
individual malice for the absence of evil. A journalist at the Adolf Eichmann trial, Arendt was 
troubled by Eichmann’s psychological normality and lack of personal prejudice against Jews, for 
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he had done more than nearly anyone to organize the Final Solution.103 The horrifyingly ordinary 
figure of Eichmann caused her to question whether one must be insane or hold hateful ideas to 
participate in evil. In Israeli author Amos Elon’s words, Arendt “insisted that only good had any 
depth. Good can be radical; evil can only be extreme, for it possesses neither depth nor any 
demonic dimension… Evil comes from a failure to think.”104 Studying Hungarian guilt in the 
Holocaust does not require ascribing personal blame, but it does require that we study the pre-
conditions that allowed hundreds of thousands of Hungarians to fail to understand or grapple 
with their role in mass murder.  
 What I have laid out is far from a comprehensive chronology of the Hungarian 
Holocaust. In addition to numerous examples of Hungarian heroism in the face of the Nazi 
occupation, it has left out the history of reluctance of Hungarian conservatives to be pulled too 
deeply into Axis allegiance. For example, in the 1930s Hungarian courts defied Hitler by 
convicting as war criminals several Hungarian officers complicit in Jewish massacres. And in 
1941 Prime Minister Pál Teleki, quoted as an anti-Semite two paragraphs ago, committed 
suicide, presumably after he saw his policy of non-intervention overruled when Hungary allowed 
Germany to use Hungarian railways to invade Yugoslavia. My point is not to condemn all 
Hungarians as guilty or to claim that nothing is morally salvageable from the 1930s, but to 
emphasize that a useful explanation of the Hungarian Holocaust must begin before 1944, lest one 
is to believe the government’s skewed perspective that Hungarian Christian nationalism was 
blameless and honorable.  
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The Long Nineteenth Century 
 At the center of many of these debates is Hungary’s conservative regent, Miklós Horthy. 
A common factor through Hungary’s interwar and World War II history, Horthy’s name has 
become a shorthand for the “respectable” interwar conservative right. Through the legacy of 
Horthy, we can glean some insight into why Orbán’s government is reluctant to let go of 
interwar Hungary as a proud period.  
 The admiral-turned-regent Miklós Horthy is a moral grey area in Hungarian history, not 
unlike Paul von Hindenburg in Germany. Although not Nazis themselves, both leaders 
demonstrated extreme right-wing sympathies; Hindenburg appointed Hitler as Chancellor and 
Horthy appointed the anti-Semitic Gyula Gömbös as Prime Minister. Although there is little 
evidence that Horthy desired the genocide of Europe’s Jews as Hitler envisioned, historians have 
suggested that his actions contributed to the Hungarian Holocaust. Horthy and Hindenburg are 
significant because they bridged the gap of two historical eras. Many remember the German 
nineteenth century proudly as the era of Prussian triumphalism and nearly pan-German 
unification under Bismarck. However, within decades this golden era was supplanted by the rise 
of Nazism.  
 Similarly, Hungarians remember the nineteenth century by commemorating Kossuth, the 
hero of the 1848 Revolution against the Austrians, which was crushed only with the help of a 
Russian army. Revolutionaries such as Kossuth represent to Hungarians the resilience of 
Hungarian liberal nationalism under the yoke of Habsburg rule. Hungarians also commemorate 
the 1867 legal emancipation of the Jews which granted them equal rights. The figure of Miklós 
Horthy, a World War I admiral and aged aristocrat by the interwar period, stands with a foot in 
both worlds. He simultaneously represents the proud liberal nationalism of the pre-World War I 
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years and the crumbling interwar aristocracy which, motivated by political expediency and its 
own anti-Semitism, aided Hitler in the mass murder of Hungarian citizens. By lionizing Horthy, 
Fidesz has capitalized on the myth of Hungary’s golden century and pushed its boundary to the 
spring of 1944.   
 
The Hungarian Holocaust in the 1990s and Beyond 
 Honoring Horthy is neither new in Hungary nor exclusive to the extreme right. In 2017 
for instance Viktor Orbán drew criticism from the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum 
for referring to Horthy as a “statesman.” This was not a radical claim, however, within Hungary. 
After World War II Horthy lived in Portugal until his death in 1957, where he was buried. In 
September 1993, the center right Antall government ceremonially reburied the regent’s body in 
his Hungarian hometown, Kenderes. Several Hungarian cabinet members and tens of thousands 
of spectators witnessed the ceremony, welcoming the regent back into the canon of Hungarian 
history after the communists had exiled his person and his legacy.105   
 The event sparked protests and was accompanied by several other moves by the 
government to place a lid on crimes of the Horthy era. In 1994 Hungary’s Constitutional Court 
reversed the convictions of several Hungarian war criminals and Nazi-collaborators who had 
been convicted under the post-war People’s Tribunal Act. The court ruled that these 
collaborators were not punishable for their actions, which included ghettoization, expropriation, 
and deportation, because they were not illegal at the time of their commission.106 For 
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comparison, this is the argument that prosecutors at the post-war Nuremberg trials nullified by 
accusing Nazis of universal crimes against humanity. Throughout the 1990s Hungarian courts 
passed data protection laws making it difficult for historians to access many archival materials 
from the interwar period which might have incriminated Nazi-collaborators.107 Professor Braham 
also points out that the Hungarian government’s pre-occupation with unearthing the crimes of 
communism caused it to be neglectful of surviving Jewish families whose property the 
Hungarian government had stolen in 1944. In 1998 Viktor Orbán’s attention on the issue 
amounted to an offer to pay 150 dollars to Jewish families for each family member who was a 
victim of the Holocaust, presuming they could prove it.108  
 Hungary never experienced a 1968 moment like in Germany where college aged youths, 
the first generation to be born after the Second World War, pulled back the collective amnesia 
around The Holocaust. Hungary spent 1968 firmly within the Soviet bloc and following a state-
supported narrative that communists had been the victims and martyrs of World War II, and that 
the racial anti-Semitism of fascism was less significant than its function as an imperialist death-
throe against socialism. In the 1990s, Hungarian public memory was pre-occupied with trying to 
define a new post-communist identity that also exposed the psychological scars of living under 
communism. 
This is not to say that the Holocaust was ignored completely—far from it. The first Orbán 
regime contributed to an exhibit at the Auschwitz museum and the 1990s and the 2000s saw the 
construction of two major Holocaust memorials in Budapest: The Tree of Life Memorial and the 
Shoes on the Danube. In 2004 the left-wing government commissioned the Holocaust Memorial 
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Center in Budapest which contains an archive and research center within a renovated Synagogue. 
However, the publicity and volume of visitors to these sites pales in comparison to the House of 
Terror which saw one thousand visitors per day before Covid-19. Although a robust academic 
Holocaust historiography has persisted in Hungary since the late Cold War era, Hungary’s 
reckoning with the Holocaust on the scale of government commemoration is just getting started. 
The events of 2014 were intended to elevate Hungary’s Holocaust historiography to the same 
level of attention as the House of Terror. 
 
The House of Fates 
“The identification with the victim affirms a radical separation from the perpetrator. The Treblinka guard 
who starts the engine or the NKVD officer who pulls the trigger is not me, he is the person who kills someone like 
myself. Yet it is unclear whether this identification with the victim brings much knowledge…”109  
– Timothy Snyder. 
The façade of the House of Fates is sleek and modern, constructed from concrete and 
glass.110 A giant silver star of David perches in midair, suspended by two towers. Inside, the 
museum is nearly vacant save for some benches and tables coated in saran wrap.111 
 Since 2014 the House of Fates has not seen a single visitor. So long as Mária Schmidt 
directs the project, MAZSIHISZ (the Federation of Hungarian Jewish Communities) will not 
endorse it. Without the support of Hungary’s Jews or the international Holocaust museum 
community the government has hesitated to complete the project. Although the building’s shell is 
now a time capsule to 2014, Mária Schmidt had planned for it to be a museum of the future. The 
House of Fates was to incorporate visual and interactive storytelling through iPads, cinematic 
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displays, and personalized journeys through the museum’s artefacts and historical actors. 
Schmidt designed the House of Fates to induct a new generation, fourteen to twenty-four-year-
olds, into the field of Holocaust History.112 Why have so many turned against the project? 
 
 
Exterior of the House of Fates.113 
One reason is that Schmidt’s support for the controversial Memorial to the Victims of German 
Occupation demonstrated that she had not abandoned Double Genocide historiography which 
refuses to differentiate between the Holocaust and Christian suffering under communism. Mária 
Schmidt has even criticized the Hungarian Jewish community for monopolizing memory of 
historical suffering: [The descendants of Holocaust victims] “still want to tell us who we can 
grieve for and who we cannot, and who we can shed a tear for and who we cannot. They demand 
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empathy from us every single day of the year while they are closing their hearts and remain blind 
and deaf to others’ misery.”114   
 Unlike the House of Terror, the House of Fates is exclusively a Holocaust museum. With 
its chosen premise being an Auschwitz-bound railway line in 1944, it places its narrative firmly 
before the Soviet occupation. Schmidt planned for the museum to foreground several heroic 
figures: Raoul Wallenberg, Hannah Szenes, Margit Slachta, and Sára Salkaház. While all these 
stories are worth telling, by focusing almost exclusively on the Holocaust’s innocent victims and 
heroes The House of Fates shines its spotlight on a minority while failing to reckon with the 
passivity of the vast majority of Hungarians during the Holocaust. With its “wall of perpetrators” 
it directs blame for the Holocaust to a relatively small cadre of Nazis and Quislings which it 
holds apart from the otherwise pure-intentioned Hungarian population. As Mónika Kovács 
argues of global Holocaust remembrance in the twenty-first century, “The moral security of 
standing with the victim (‘standing on the good side’) leaves no urge for understanding the 
motives of perpetrators and bystanders.”115 
 While a memorial preserves memory of an event and its surrounding emotions across 
generations and is the interpretation of a politician, artist, or organization, a museum should seek 
to educate visitors, using artifacts as its tools. Through both the House of Terror and the House 
of Fates, Schmidt has blended the two methods of memory together. Indeed, what makes the 
House of Terror so troubling is how it uses the building of 60 Andrassy—which was occupied by 
both Nazis and communists—to tell a story with a political slant. The House of Fates is similar in 
that it distorts our perception of the past not by falsifying information but through its selection of 
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stories. Mária Schmidt hoped the museum would “make a contribution to reconciliation, to a 
discussion of the tragedies of the past to settle issues and to at least alleviate, if not bring to an 
end, all of the evil and purposeless accusations constantly experienced even today.” Thereby, she 
would be “neutralizing or at least weakening the forces continuously calling Hungary an anti-
Semitic and fascist country, using these unfounded stigmata as a political weapon to discredit the 
Hungarian nation as a whole.”116 Without explicitly denying the existence of Hungarian 
collaboration in the Holocaust on a large scale, by foregrounding stories of innocent actors and 
heroes the radical right directs the conversation away from the culpability of historic Hungarian 
nationalism.  
   
Conclusion 
 “To the extent that we encourage monuments to do our memory-work for us, we become that much more 
forgetful. In effect, the initial impulse to memorialize events like the Holocaust may actually spring from an opposite 
and equal desire to forget them.”117 
- James Young 
 “In our view, the fact that we are allowed to display this part of the past in a museum can feed our hope 
that we have overcome this past, and that it does not affect our lives today anymore.”118  
- Mária Schmidt. 
 One of the most troubling themes in Schmidt’s historiography is the claim that under the 
Orbán administration the Jewish and Christian populations have reconciled. Although an 
admirable goal, it is disingenuous to proclaim its completion when the government refuses to 
acknowledge the extent to which the Christian population at large benefited from anti-Semitism. 
For thousands of Christian Hungarians who were admitted to a university in the interwar era 
there were Jews who had been denied entry by law. For so many Hungarian families given 
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shelter after a bombing raid in 1944 there was a Jewish family evicted to a ghetto. The frequent 
criticism the Orbán administration draws from Yad Vashem, the USHMM and MAZSIHISZ 
casts further doubt on its so-called reconciliation. Nevertheless, Mária Schmidt has referred to 
Hungary’s relationship with its Jews as a “love story.”119 To the Hungarian radical right the 
process of atoning for the Holocaust is complete: “We are at a point where some groups would 
like to consider their ancestors’ tragic fate an inheritable and advantageous privilege. They 
would like this ‘victim status’ to bleed to generations of those who suffered no harm.”120 
 James Young, an expert on Holocaust memorials, has outlined the dangers of so-called 
atonement and reconciliation. In contrast to The House of Fates or Memorial to the Victims of 
German Occupation, Young describes a memorial proposed by Horst Hoheisel in 1995 to destroy 
the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. Instead of building a new monument, the empty space where the 
Gate once stood would symbolize Germany’s absent Jewish community.121 James Young 
suggests that Hoheisel knew the memorial committee would reject his design and that this 
rejection was itself a part of the art piece: “Here he seemed to suggest that the surest engagement 
with Holocaust memory in Germany may actually lie in its perpetual irresolution, that only an 
unfinished memorial process, can guarantee the life of memory.”122 A complete memorial can 
symbolize that a people has placed a cap on an event; it puts people’s consciences at ease 
because the event is no longer current, but history, and because the monument preserves the 
history people are free to forget it in their everyday lives. Oblivion in the place of a monument 
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symbolizes that the Holocaust cannot be undone and requires a nation’s active attention to keep 
the memory alive.  
 Hoheisel’s design was too radical and esoteric to be put into practice, and we should not 
expect governments to subscribe to his vision. However, there are several Holocaust memorials 
in Germany which adhere to a similar philosophy, such as the Grunewald Station “Memorial to 
the Jews Deported from Berlin,” which displays several human-like silhouettes carved into a 
wall in negative space.123 The popularity of this style of memorial helps to contrast the interests 
behind the House of Fates and the Memorial to the Victims of German Occupation. 
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Chapter 3 – Immigration and National Survival: The Radical Right’s Historiography of Trianon 
 “Today there is no Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, or Soviet Union. There is no British or French Empire. 
And what’s left of them is now twisting in the multicultural grip of their vindictive colonies… Even the greatest 
cannot avoid the justice of history.”
125
  
- Viktor Orbán. 
Sirens flashed in the darkness illuminating the faces of hundreds of Syrian refugees, 
many carrying children, as they corralled themselves along a highway shoulder. Stranded in 
Budapest by the Hungarian government, they had elected to walk to the Austrian border on foot 
in a caravan which kept them within the protective view of the public and media. But as the 
busses sent by the Hungarian government slowed alongside them, they feared they would be 
taken not west but to detainment camp. A voice lamented, “I swear to God if they take us to a 
camp, or treat us badly again… Where is the guarantee? Where is the UN? Don’t trust them 
now.”126  
Although the Hungarian government frames Syrians as invaders who intend to settle 
Hungary, most only want to pass through it on their way west. Since the Syrian refugee crisis 
began in 2015, fewer refugees have settled in Hungary and Poland than nearly anywhere else in 
the European Union. Yet Hungary has militarized the migration issue: its fence along the Serbian 
border is electrified and armed with cameras and heat sensors.127 In May 2020 an EU court 
ordered Hungary to take down its so-called “transit zones,” which were cages where the 
government detained refugees illegally.128 
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Immigration and the Radical Right’s Historical Narrative 
Hungary has framed its immigration policy as a reaction to the so-called disaster of 
German Wilkommenskultur (Welcome Culture). In 2015 news footage displayed thousands of 
German volunteers gathering outside train stations to distribute water and fresh clothes to Syrian 
refugees. Conscious of the Nazi past, and that the eyes of the world were upon them, Germans 
demonstrated their willingness to become a multi-ethnic society. Meanwhile the Hungarian 
radical right warned that in the coming decades mass immigration would erode the cultural 
integrity of welcoming nations. In her essay, “Without Knocking: Long Live Mentally 
Globalized, Internationalist Germany,” Mária Schmidt quoted the Iranian revolutionary and 
cleric, Ayatollah Khomeini: “If Islam is not politics, Islam is nothing.” She then opined, “Yes, 
Islam is politics and religion at the same time.”129 The radical right often argues that Islam is 
both a religion and an oppressive ideology, and so anti-Islam does not contradict Europe’s 
traditions of religious tolerance any more than anti-fascism. West European radical rightists have 
even engaged in “homo-nationalism” in which they point to Islamist intolerance of 
homosexuality to frame anti-Islam as a civic responsibility.   
 The Hungarian radical right maintains that it is not racist but is concerned by Middle 
Eastern immigration because culture is primordial to a geographic location. On its face, this 
“ethnopluralism” does not ascribe value to cultures and ethnicities. Instead, its followers argue 
that because one cannot unlearn their culture, and culture provides the foundation upon which 
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societal and governmental values stand, the spread of foreign cultures erodes the supports of a 
tolerant and unified society. One can see how this argument borders and perhaps overlaps 
biological racism. Specifically, the radical right holds that Muslims subscribe to backwards and 
authoritarian values, and desire to subjugate Europeans under Sharia Law, or “dhimmitude.” By 
contrast, the radical right often maintains that European toleration stems from Christian 
secularism.  
The radical right therefore rejects the claim that those fleeing poverty and violence have a 
universal right to cross borders. While it is unfortunate that there is a war in Syria, the sovereign 
nation’s desire to remain homogenous outweighs the plight of the refugee. In the words of 
Orbán, “I am convinced that Hungary has the right—and every nation has the right—to say that 
it does not want its country to change.”130 In the radical right’s view, nationality and culture are 
not artificial constructs to be overcome, but inherent in the unconscious memory of a nation 
which is irrevocably tethered to its forbears, national heritage, and geography. To the radical 
right the Carpathians and the Danube are not just geographic features but a fortress which 
defended Christian Hungary for a thousand years against Mongols and Ottomans.  
 In the words of some Hungarians, this framing of immigration and the right of a nation 
to remain homogenous draws on Hungary’s history of external domination. In 2018 VPRO 
interviewed two Hungarian college students about why the government was so popular. The first 
student claimed that the government made itself popular by instilling Hungarians with the fear 
that dark-skinned people would take away their jobs.131 Thus Fidesz could define itself in 
 
130 “Viktor Orbán's speech at the 14th Kötcse civil picnic,” The Prime Minister, September 17, 2015, http://2010-
2015.miniszterelnok.hu/in_english_article/viktor_orban_s_speech_at_the_14th_kotcse_civil_picnic.  




contrast to the mainstream left which is silent on the apparent threat of immigration. The 
interviewer turned to the second man, a law student who said he wanted stay in Hungary in part 
to counteract the Hungarian brain drain which began in 1990. He explained that while fear of 
outside forces galvanized government support, the government had not invented that fear; 
instead, he attributed it to Hungary’s historical memory and narrative: “Hungarian history was 
totally different from Western history... We were under the oppression of the Turkish empire… 
then under the oppression of the Austrian kings. So, the Hungarian soul, at least my soul, is 
totally different from a Western—like from a French person’s.”132 Another way of framing it is 
that the Hungarian experience is in some ways similar to those of nations which European 
empires colonized.  
In Hungary’s historical narrative, its suspicion is a hard-learned lesson from its history. 
According to István Rév, a Hungarian scholar and archivist, what makes this narrative so 
compelling is that “although it seems that we Hungarians have always been victims, in fact we 
have always been martyrs and heroes. And to a certain extent, even today we are heroes.”133 Like 
the Serbian nationalist narrative of its defeat against the Ottomans at the Battle of Kosovo in 
1389, the story of a defeat can be inspiring by coloring the nation’s historical perseverance with 
the language of redemption. Australians, for example, celebrate ANZAC Day every spring to 
commemorate the Australian volunteers who died in Britain’s disastrous invasion of Ottoman 
Gallipoli during World War I. Frank Bongiorno writes that in Australian memory April 25th, 
1915, the day of the ANZAC landing in the Dardanelles, was the day that the modern Australian 
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nation was born out of the British Empire in a “baptism of fire.”134 In Hungary’s narrative, on 
Europe’s eastern frontier against the Ottoman Empire and Eurasian steppe, Hungarians were 
Christian Europe’s guardians from Asiatic hordes who sought to destroy it. Although Hungary 
spent much of its history dominated by foreign empires and the Soviet Union it has outlasted 
those institutions. Viktor Orbán mobilized this narrative before the European Parliament in 2018 
when its members accused the Fidesz regime of violating the rule of law.135 In response Orbán 
framed the Parliament’s accusations against the Hungarian government as an attack on the 
Hungarian people who had chosen the government. Orbán then warned the Parliament, “You’re 
going to denounce Hungary that rebelled and took up arms against the biggest army of the world, 
the Soviet army, and shed its blood for freedom and democracy… I stand here today and see 
those accusing Hungary are the ones who inherited democracy, who did not have to take 
personal risks in order to obtain liberty.”136 
Fidesz and its supporters have innovated by mobilizing Hungary’s historical resentment 
towards Ottomans, Austrians, and Russians to accuse the European Union, particularly Germany 
and the Western European member states, of seeking to vassalize Hungary. In his 2016 speech 
commemorating Hungary’s 1848 Revolution, Orbán declared 
Europe is not free, because freedom starts with the statement of the truth… It is forbidden 
 to state that in Brussels they are currently scheming to transport foreigners here as 
 quickly as possible and to settle them among us. It is forbidden to say that the objective 
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 of this settlement is to redraw the religious and cultural patterns of Europe, to rebuild its 
 ethnic footings, thereby eliminating the nation-states that represent the last impediment to 
 the Internationale.137  
With his reference to the “Internationale” or First Communist International, Orbán alluded to the 
historical precedent for the West and East colluding against Hungary. In Hungarian history, 
perhaps no other event serves as so compelling a metaphor for this supposed siege than the 
Treaty of Trianon in 1920. Between 1918 to 1920, Hungary fell from its stature as the eastern 
half of the great Austro-Hungarian Empire to a small and weak state surrounded by potentially 
aggressive neighbors. Romanian Transylvanians, Czechs, Slovaks, and South Slavs who had 
lived beneath the Habsburg monarchy seized the post-war moment and President Woodrow 
Wilson’s doctrine of national self determination to gain independence. In the contemporary 
radical right’s framing Trianon was not a mutual agreement with the Entente, but a crime 
committed against Hungary. As Gábor Gyáni argues, in Hungarian memory there is a “Trianon 
syndrome” which has managed to “monopolize and reserve for itself the national claim for the 
‘true’ traumatic past.”138 This narrative has gone hand in hand with the nationalization, or 
“Magyarization” of twentieth-century Hungarian victimhood.139  
In 2020 the Hungarian government commemorated the one hundredth anniversary of 
Trianon with a new memorial. Before analyzing the language of 1920/2020 and connecting it to 
both immigration and Holocaust remembrance, I will briefly sketch the details of the Treaty of 
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Trianon and its cultural impact on Hungary.
 
Map of the Treaty of Trianon 1920.140  
 
 
“No! No! Never!” 
 “The diktat [Trianon] saw two thirds of the country’s territory and 63 per cent of its population shorn from 
us; thus, one in three Hungarians found themselves outside our borders. The verdict was obviously a death sentence. 
History has not recorded a nation that could survive such a loss of blood. Those responsible for the decision were 
versed in history and delivered their verdict in the light of that knowledge.”141  
 - Viktor Orbán. 
 The Treaty of Trianon signed June 4, 1920, was one of several post-World War I treaties 
which broke up the imperial holdings of the Central Powers, the most famous of which is 
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Versailles which many understand as an unnecessarily punitive treaty intended to punish 
Germany. Post-war Hungary would have been envious of Germany’s deal. In 1920 the Kingdom 
of Hungary lost two thirds of its territory and three fifths of its population.142 To many, what they 
knew as Hungary had ceased to exist and what was left was unrecognizable. Maps of the new 
Hungary lined the streets with the words, “No! No! Never!”143 At a 1934 diocesan conference to 
discuss Hungarian birth-rates a Calvinist priest, Geza Kiss, asked, “What is happening here? The 
ancient and pure Hungarian race (az ostiszta magyarfaj), the Reformed community, is on the 
verge of extinction, and an ugly (szornyu) mix of peoples is coming for their place… I know of 
one village in the Ormanysag, where the gypsies at the edge of the village already have more 
children than the entire village.”144 The similarity between how some interwar Hungarians and 
the contemporary radical right frame population replacement by minorities is striking.  
  
Interwar Hungarian propaganda papers advocating territorial revisionism.145 
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 The beginning of the interwar period was a bloody time in Eastern Europe: after the 
Great War Hungarians clashed with Romania for control of Transylvania, and Poland struggled 
for independence against Stalin and the Red army amidst the Russian Civil War. From 
Hungary’s perspective, tectonic forces were shifting that threatened to destroy the isolated 
nation. The Treaty of Trianon breached Hungary’s natural defenses of the Carpathians in the 
East, and Hungarian politicians feared that they would soon be invaded by communists. Earlier 
in the chapter I mentioned the importance of historical defeats in nationalist narratives. The 
following description by historian Paul Hanebrink illustrates this tradition in the interwar period:  
 [Responses] to the Treaty of Trianon… placed the state at the center of a national cult of 
 martyrdom, in which Hungary was a crucified Christ whose resurrection would come 
 with the revision of the unjust borders. Numerous commemorative albums, written and 
 translated into other European languages to publicize the injustice done to Hungary, 
 depicted the nation, represented pictorially as all the historic crownlands of St. Istvan 
 before partition, on a cross or with a crown of thorns.146 
But Trianon is more complicated. Maps which show Hungary’s old and new borders without 
overlays of the region’s demography obscure the fact that while it held no overseas colonies, the 
Kingdom of Hungary was nevertheless an empire. Through Trianon millions of people who were 
Serbian, Slovakian, and Romanian were repatriated to their nation-states of choice. Each nation 
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Trianon 2020: The Year of National Unity 
 At 4:30 PM on June 4th, 2020, thousands of church bells rang across Hungary to 
commemorate the exact moment, one hundred years before, when Hungary signed the Treaty of 
Trianon. Then, delayed due to Covid-19, the government inaugurated its new Trianon Memorial 
in Budapest on August 20. The monument is a 100-meter by 4-meter ramp near the Parliament 
building with dark walls rising on either side. As visitors walk down the ramp, they can read the 
names of Hungary’s twelve thousand municipalities etched into the surrounding walls. 
Symbolizing national unity, the names of the regions lost in 1920 are displayed alongside those 
still within Hungary’s borders. So that there would be no pattern or separation between the 
annexed territories and the land Hungary retained, the order of the names of the municipalities 
was chosen randomly by an algorithm.147 
 
Trianon Memorial in Budapest nearby the Parliament building.148 
 







 At the monument’s inauguration Viktor Orbán declared, “One hundred years after defeat 
in the First World War and the Trianon diktat, today we stand on the stage of European history 
as champions of survival…We are sailing in uncharted waters. In our eyes the West has lost its 
attraction, and in their eyes the world of Central Europe does not seem to be a desirable one.”149 
To Orbán, Hungary’s survival through its political fragmentation in the twentieth century proved 
that it could be independent from the vassalage of foreign institutions. In the radical right’s 
narrative, during the Cold War Hungarians looked West to liberalism and capitalism, but in the 
2000s and 2010s, adopting Western norms came at the cost of ceding sovereignty to the 
European Union, as well as adopting multiculturalism which threatened to denationalize Eastern 
Europe. In 2020 the Hungarian House Speaker, László Kövér, declared that “Trianon is not 
merely an unfinished piece of history but also a present and future European issue… Because 
today each and every European nation has to confront the anti-national sentiments threatening 
their existence, and in the future all of them will have to fight for the preservation of their own 
identity in order to survive.”150 Trianon teaches that Hungary should not trust the promises of 
foreign powers, particularly the promise that nationalism is the antithesis of modern European 
values, rather than their guardian.  
 Trianon trauma is pervasive throughout Hungarian society in large part because it has 
become divorced from the militarism attached to it in the interwar era. Ignoring calls from the 
extreme right, Orbán is satisfied with the current borders of Central-Eastern Europe and has 
pursued alternative means to overturn Trianon. In essence, if he cannot regain Hungarian land, 
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he can regain its people. In 2010 Fidesz passed a law offering citizenship, voting rights, and 
participation in Hungarian social programs to ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring Romania. 
Around one million Hungarian Romanians accepted the offer and ninety-five percent of them 
vote for Fidesz.151 While dual citizens in Romania, Ukraine, and Serbia can vote my mail, 
Hungarian expatriates who the government fears will vote against Fidesz cannot.152 Aside from 
Fidesz’s strategic goal in gaining roughly one million extra votes in a country with a population 
smaller than ten million, the law also fits into Orbán’s stated vision of a nationalist, illiberal, 
albeit quasi-democratic government. Another example of Orbán’s policy of cross-borders 
national unity was his support in 2020 for VMSZ, a Hungarian political party running in the 
upcoming Serbian elections. Interviewer Zoltán Kozma asked Orbán why it was important for 
Hungarians to seek national representation in countries where they are a minority. Orbán 
responded that “we Hungarians… [are] a cultural and linguistic island here in the middle of 
Europe… If our communities are absorbed, assimilated and merged, they will lose their 
Hungarian culture and the Hungarian language: we will simply disappear.”153 
 The Hungarian National Museum echoed these sentiments in its 2020 temporary exhibit 
on Trianon trauma and culture, writing that “The exhibition renders the talent and creativity of 
Hungarian people visible, and makes us aware that preserving the Hungarian spiritual unity takes 
active effort, and that the living cultural heritage of the community shall be passed on.”154 
Similar to 2014’s theme of Holocaust remembrance and subsequent reconciliation between 
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Hungary and the Jewish community, the government declared 2020 to be a year of national 
unity. Although Hungary no longer covets its lost land, the map of its old borders—chosen by 
the Hungarian National Museum to advertise its exhibit—is not merely a far-right symbol but a 
mainstream image which represents the resilience of the Hungarian spirit across borders. And 
because, according to the government, one does not cease to be a Hungarian when he or she no 
longer lives within the state—even if they have never visited post-Trianon Hungary—it is the 
government’s duty to represent them all.  
 The radical right did not so much create Trianon trauma has harness its symbolism and 
emotional gravity. As Jan-Werner Müller has pointed out, in Hungary it is extremely common to 
see license plates imprinted with maps of the Hungarian crownlands.155 A documentary about 
Trianon by the Hungarian magazine, Index, explained how after the fall of communism the 
repressed feelings about Trianon “broke free,” and suddenly cars became plastered with greater-
Hungary bumper-stickers. Notably, however, the left-wing MSZP chose not to employ Trianon 
symbolism due to its nationalistic overtones.156 Anna Menyhert, a scholar of Hungary, includes 
an anecdote in her article, “The Image of the ‘Maimed Hungary’ in the 20th Century,” in which 
her eleven-year-old son returned from school on a Trianon memorial-day, shaken, and explained 
that the teacher had played the class a song about Trianon with the lines: “There is no place for 
me on earth / where I could lay my head. / A border separates me from my / sweetheart (…) / 
Borders won’t separate us, we speak the same language, for god’s sake! / Hungarians suffer from 
Trianon, / Tell me, why did we allow this to happen, / why?”157 In class her son had seen posters 
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showing bloody hands tearing out pieces of Hungary from its map, and he wanted to know what 
he could do to stop them.158  
 While Trianon is a poignant national symbol regardless of one’s political orientation, the 
Hungarian radical right mobilizes it by claiming to identify and combat the figurative bloody 
hands which claw at Hungary. To Mária Schmidt, Trianon represents Western Europe’s 
historical condescension to the East: The West has “always communicated with the Eastern part 
of Europe from the altitude of a podium, the way they always had with their colonies…”159 In the 
twenty-first century, the radical right mobilizes Trianon trauma to help it frame the European 
Union. In his June 2020 Trianon commemoration speech Prime Minister Orbán accused:  
 The West raped the thousand-year-old borders and history of Central Europe. They 
 forced us to live between indefensible borders, deprived us of our natural treasures, 
 separated us from our resources, and made a death row out of our country. Central             
 Europe was redrawn without moral concerns, just as the borders of Africa and the Middle 
 East were redrawn. We will never forget that they did this.160  
By mentioning Africa and the Middle East, Orbán framed Trianon as Hungary’s own Sykes-
Picot agreement, in which imperialists supposedly drew lines haphazardly across a map of the 
Middle East without regard for the communities they were destroying or geopolitical conflicts 
they were brewing. Ultimately, to the radical right the Treaty of Trianon is a symbol of 
uncertainty in Central-Eastern Europe. Therefore, Hungarians should not allow politics to divide 
them. This is the core of Viktor Orbán’s populism: true Hungarians choose to support Fidesz 
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because to oppose it is to sow division which, in the face of the dual threat of the European 
Union and mass immigration, could prove deadly to Hungarian independence.  
 In the Hungarian radical right’s framing, society is divided between Hungarians who are 
proud of their history and want their civilization to survive and Hungarians who are ashamed of 
their past and see internationalism as the future. Mária Schmidt maintains that one only needs to 
look to Germany to see a nation well “On the road to self-destruction.” Schmidt argues, “It is 
becoming increasingly evident that the reason for the European community’s lack of a common 
army or border control force, indeed for the lack of will or any effort to set up one, is the absence 
of commonly held values that its members would see as worthy of protection.”161 Schmidt’s last 
clause, “worthy of protection,” is significant because the problem Europe faces is not only a lack 
of values, but the delusion that its values are not worth fighting for.  
Schmidt’s argument exemplifies British journalist David Goodhart’s theory of twenty-
first century politics that it is divided between “people from somewhere and people from 
anywhere.”162 The “anywheres,” according to Goodhart, tend to be highly educated, mobile 
people who value openness and are wary of group attachments. By contrast, the “somewheres” 
are generally rooted in local communities and value their group attachments. Another way of 
looking at this division is Ivan Krastev’s analysis that the East European right mistrusts 
bureaucrats with “convertible competencies.” These kinds of people are often highly educated, 
multi-lingual and, as Krastev phrases it, equally capable of running a bank in Bulgaria or 
Bangladesh.163 The Eastern European right—the “somwheres”—mistrust these elites because 
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they suspect that if their country was to suffer an economic crisis, the “anywheres” would 
abandon them.  
In contrast to modern Germany which is dominated by “anywheres,” Orban explains that 
“… we should first of all declare that our political notions have both intellectual and spiritual 
foundations. Secondly, we should declare that the past thousand years of Hungarian politics has 
always stood on such foundations.”164 To the radical right, the culmination of Hungary’s 
historical narrative has been to establish a government of “somewheres,” who are not only driven 
by personal gain, or vague liberal-internationalist ideals, but grounded in Hungary by their 
loyalty to their ethnicity and Christian faith. To the radical right, shame over the Holocaust and 
the notion that the nationalist sentiments which have historically unified Hungarians were 
necessary to ostracize interwar Jews, threatens this project. According to Mária Schmidt, 
“[Angela] Merkel cannot stand either Germans or Europeans. She is particularly disdainful of 
Germans, who will forever remain Nazis and collectively guilty.”165 Schmidt goes on to describe 
the recent guilty verdict of a low level Auschwitz administrator in Germany to warn that the 
danger of collective guilt is not only that it condemns the innocent, but that it relieves guilt from 
the Holocaust’s true perpetrators by placing them on the same plain of culpability as guards and 
paper-pushers.166 Although Schmidt does not explicitly reference the Hungarian past in this 
section of her essay, we can transpose its argument onto the right’s historiography of Hungary, 
which claims that the court of international opinion has laid the crimes of Hitler and Eichmann 
wrongly at the feet of Miklos Horthy.  
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Maintaining National Unity 
 “Germany, Europe’s strongest country wears sackcloth and ashes day and night in atonement for the 
Holocaust, while the rest of the West is doing so in repentance for its colonial past. As far as we are concerned, we 
don’t intend to join that rivalry about whose sins are greater. We believe that the future doesn’t require continuous 
atonement from us.”167  
- Mária Schmidt. 
 Although the radical right often frames liberal critiques of Fidesz as foreign and directed 
by sinister corporate interests, there is a robust Hungarian scholarly community which challenges 
the government’s policies and historiography. One prominent liberal institution was the Central 
European University (CEU), which employed István Rév, László Karsai and András Bozóki. 
Originally founded by Hungarian born Jewish financier George Soros in 1991, the CEU was 
intended to instill Hungarians with liberal-democratic values that would guide a new elite to 
democratic governance following the transition from communism. As its rector, Michael 
Ignatieff has explained, the intention for the university was not to condescendingly explain 
democracy to Eastern-Europeans, but to ensure that the young and essentially rootless Hungarian 
democracy was not exploited.168 Pointing to its liberal political leanings, and the image of its 
émigré founder Soros and Canadian Rector Ignatieff, Fidesz has painted the university as a 
globalist-socialist colony on Hungarian soil. Indeed, a favorite saying of Orbán is that “a liberal 
is nothing more than a communist with a university degree.”169 Throughout the 2010s the CEU 
published papers about Orbán’s authoritarianism and educated young people about feminism and 
gender theory. Although this liberal education often came from Hungarian professors, the fact 
that it was a foreign institution helped Fidesz to portray it as a Western colonial enclave which 
brainwashed Hungarians into abandoning their nationalist and socially conservative values.  
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 In 2017 the Central European University came under legal attacks from the government 
when the National Assembly drafted a bill on higher education declaring that foreign universities 
accredited in Hungary must have a campus in their home country. Although the law did not refer 
to the CEU explicitly, it was clearly the law’s target as it was based in New York state, but did 
not have a campus there. The CEU arrived at a deal with New York Governor Cuomo to set up a 
small fifteen-student campus in Bard College, but the Hungarian government refused to back 
down and the CEU relocated its primary campus to Vienna.170 The CEU affair demonstrates that 
a powerful illiberal democracy can take tangible steps to instate what it vaunts as national unity. 
It symbolizes how the government, in its apparent struggle to break free of the chains of leftist 
and liberal ideals, is willing to dictate Hungarian patriotism from above. 
 Fidesz also claims to defend the Hungarian nation from the threat of Muslim invasion. In 
2018 Viktor Orbán warned that “everyone should be wary of the idea of Islam being part of any 
European country. If Islam is part of Germany, for instance, in Muslim terms this means that 
Germany is part of Islam.”171 According to the radical right, Muslim immigration is nothing 
short of the pre-cursor to the destruction of Hungary. First, Muslims will vote their own parties 
into parliament. Then, according to Mária Schmidt, once they have surpassed the Christian 
population in number through their higher birthrates, they will deprive “us indigenous Christian-
Jewish populations of our land as early as in the near future. All this is underway in front of our 
eyes and with precious support by our political and media elites consisting of left-wing, sixty-
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eighter ‘useful idiots.”172 But the Muslims are only pawns in the cosmic plot of George Soros. 
Having used his wealth and political influence to indoctrinate Hungarian politicians with 
Holocaust guilt and multi-culturalism, the Jewish financier will supposedly capitalize on the 
destruction and Islamization of European institutions to steal for himself the wealth of European 
nations.173 In 2018 Fidesz plastered Hungarian public spaces with posters of a cackling George 
Soros. It named its 2018 anti-immigration legislation the “Stop Soros Package.” 
 
Anti-Soros campaign poster. “99 percent reject illegal migration. Don’t let Soros get the last laugh.”174 
 Ironically, while Mária Schmidt criticizes liberals for holding people accountable for the 
crimes of their fathers she also asks, “Does Chancellor Merkel know, when she talks, as usual, 
about the sins of Europe and those of the Germans, that in the 17th and the 18th centuries 
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Saracens (Muslims) took masses of Christians into slavery from Italy? Does she know that they 
were sold, in chains, on slave markets in Algiers, Tunis, Tangier and Constantinople?”175 At the 
heart of the radical right’s ideology is its unwillingness to see Muslims as individuals and to 
comprehend their predicaments. Islamist states and the Muslims who live within them are 
indivisible to the radical right, and so Muslim immigrants will necessarily create a Europe in 
which minarets replace church towers and women will wear burkas to be safe in public.176 This 
conspiracy theory manifests in policies that prevent refugees from war-torn Syria, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan from reaching safety. Hungary’s location on the south-eastern border of the EU with 
Serbia makes it the first EU member state migrants encounter that is attached by land to 
wealthier nations such as Austria. Reports emerged in 2018 that Hungary was only admitting two 
asylum seekers per day.177 Hundreds of thousands remain trapped in Turkish jails, or in camps 
off the coast of Greece in places like Lesbos with little medical attention where they are 
vulnerable to sweeping wildfires.178 
 
Conclusion 
 “… what are we getting from the left?... Pure sanctimony. Pure judgement. You are not good enough. 
You’re guilty, not only for your own sins, but the sins of your fathers. The crimes of slavery and colonialism are on 
your head… Tear down those statues and bend the fucking knee.”  
- Sam Harris on the rise of Donald Trump.179 
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 Ivan Krastev has argued that the policies of Fidesz mark the end of an Age of Imitation in 
which post-communist Eastern Europe sought to model itself economically and politically after 
the liberal-democratic and capitalist West. This process, he explains, generated latent resentment 
that was inherent due to its implications of Eastern European backwardness: “the project of 
adopting a Western model under Western supervision feels like a confession of having failed to 
escape Central Europe’s historical vassalage to foreign instructors and inquisitors.”180 Despite 
the West’s promises of a better world the 1990s saw income inequality and poverty skyrocket 
across the post-communist world, while average life expectancy plummeted. For many 
Hungarians, poverty and corruption were the experiences that accompanied the political rhetoric 
of Western liberalism and Orbán has since identified higher education as a center from which 
this supposed elitism emanates from. 
 According to the Hungarian government’s ideology, survival in a post-Trianon, post-Cold 
War world requires national unity. For the nation to be unified it must root out political dissent—
if possible, by framing it as a disingenuous beachhead for foreign interests. It also means 
disputing historiography which holds that Hungarian nationalism historically led to the political 
exclusion of the Hungarian Jewish community, which was a pre-condition for the ferocity of the 
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 While many other details and paradoxes of Hungarian communism have faded with time 
in the twenty-first century, the legacy of Imre Nagy, the 1956 revolutionary, complicates the 
radical right’s narrative of leftism as foreign and anti-Hungarian. Speaking before the nation for 
the first time in 1989, Viktor Orbán praised Nagy for fighting to liberate Hungary from Soviet 
domination; his legacy lent weight and symbolism to Hungary’s second anti-communist moment. 
However, as Fidesz radicalized on the right during the 2010s, it identified Nagy’s story as 
contradictory to Hungary’s nationalistic message. In 1956 Hungarians resisted Stalinist terror 
and Soviet domination by rallying behind a left-wing leader, contradicting the radical right’s 
narrative that liberalism and Soviet communism are in essence the same idea. In the pre-morning 
darkness of December 28, 2018 Fidesz silently removed Nagy’s statue from its prominent home 
in Kossuth Square, near the Parliament building.181  
 According to the radical right European liberals have taken on the mantle of Soviet 
communism and threaten to erode Hungarian national identity and independence. In the words of 
Mária Schmidt, “Those [leftist] elites consider the end of World War Two as year zero, because 
they reject all the preceding two thousand years…”182 In other words, Holocaust guilt has 
convinced liberals that nothing is worth salvaging from European history before 1945, thus 
paving the way for them to adopt utopian and internationalist ideals borrowed from Soviet 
communism. We can see this as a reaction to the left’s post-communist politics of inevitability: 
that there is no alternative to liberalism.183 To the radical right there is an alternative: states 
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should embrace national divisions rather than overcome them because the principles of a national 
government are derived from its history and cultural traditions, which are unique to geographic 
location; nationalism is the antidote to internationalist, atheistic totalitarianism which caused 
twentieth century atrocity.  
 Lending credence to the claim that fascism and communism are fundamentally similar 
due to their totalitarianism, Mária Schmidt has quoted the Hungarian Holocaust survivor and 
author Imre Kertész: “deportation from human existence; misery, hunger, slavery and death in 
Recsk are the same as in Dachau; nor is there any difference between Kolima and Mauthausen in 
this respect... There is no way of measuring suffering, no degrees for injustice. Both the Gulag 
and the network of Nazi camps were set up for the same purpose, and the millions of victims 
bear evidence of its fulfillment.”184 While we can agree that to the people who suffered there was 
no moral distinction between fascism and Stalinism, we should remember that they mobilized 
people based on extremes of very different ideological sentiments. In the words of Tony Judt, 
“we must keep in view a crucial analytical contrast: there is a difference between regimes that 
exterminate people in the inhuman pursuit of an arbitrary objective and those whose objective is 
extermination itself.”185 
 In the House of Terror, right-wing historians claimed that Nazism and communism were 
both, at their core, atheistic. The antithesis of totalitarianism, the museum claimed, was the 
Christian idea of individual responsibility. Also implicit in the museum’s presentation is the 
parallel that both the Nazis and the communists destroyed Hungarian sovereignty. And by 
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parsing a small cadre of fascist and communist collaborators form Hungarian society at large, it 
completely ignored Hungary’s voluntary cooperation with Hitler in the Second World War.   
 During the Holocaust Memorial Year of 2014, the radical right nationalized the narrative 
of the Holocaust by framing the Hungarian nation and its sovereignty as the victims of German 
occupation, rather than Jews in particular. It thereby shifted responsibility for the Hungarian 
Holocaust entirely onto Nazi Germany. The year’s second event, the House of Fates, sought to 
symbolize that Hungary’s reconciliation and acceptance of its Jewish community was complete, 
and that anti-Semitism was an ugly chapter that Hungary should leave behind, despite the 
government’s continuing anti-Semitism—George Soros as a case in point. The danger of 
claiming this victim status is that it frees the Hungarian radical right from analyzing the fact that 
through nationalism many Hungarian victims were also perpetrators during the Holocaust.  
  The radical right’s 2020 commemoration of the Treaty of Trianon blamed Hungary’s 
interwar predicament on “western minds,” thereby mobilizing Trianon trauma as evidence that 
contemporary liberalism is the intellectual vanguard of Western imperialism. And against the 
fabricated crisis of population replacement by Muslims, the radical right has insisted that 
Hungarians should not interrogate historical prejudice, much less speak of collective guilt for the 
Holocaust, because it is merely a leftist shame-tactic. Historical self-criticism is dangerous, 
according to the radical right’s conspiracy theory, because only a nation that is subservient and 
wracked with guilt—like Germany—can open its borders to foreigners. We should see this as a 
racist view because it assumes that only a Hungary degraded in its self-esteem would be willing 
to accept immigrants from a different racial and cultural background.    
 The radical right’s Holocaust historiography is deeply interconnected with its 
Islamophobia. The same principle of Hungarian unconscious memory and unity across borders 
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that echoes throughout Orbán’s nationalist rhetoric also informs the radical right’s racist view 
that a Muslim cannot make their home in Hungary. Rather than cautiously studying the parallels 
between Islamophobia and the historic right’s framing of Jews as an alien spirit or race, the 
radical right defines the historic Hungarian right in contrast to and as a victim of Nazism. It 
thereby refuses to approach the historical question of how the Holocaust was carried out so 
quickly and brutally amidst the chaos of 1944 on the Eastern Front, and while the Nazis were 
cautious of igniting a Hungarian rebellion. Christian conservatives and militaristic radical 
rightists began isolating Hungarian Jews from the national community twenty-four years before 
the Germans invaded. Whether we interpret this as proof of Hungarian collective guilt is another 
conversation and beyond my overall point; we should not view twentieth century right-wing 
totalitarianism as wholly separate from the “respectable” Hungarian political establishment that 
fascists eventually overthrew. Interwar mainstream nationalism influenced the Hungarian 
Holocaust even if it did not directly cause it. 
 In my preface I mentioned that my experience as an American makes my perspective 
valuable. As an American I have tried to balance national pride and respect for the framers of the 
Constitution with the knowledge that they horrifically contradicted their ideals. Nobody wants to 
be told that their ancestors were slave-owners or complicit in the Holocaust. But to understand 
the role of legislation and prejudice in the Holocaust first demands that Hungarians acknowledge 
that its governing institutions were largely complicit. As in so much Holocaust literature—much 
of it centered around Arendt’s thesis of the Banality of Evil and Christopher Browning’s 
Ordinary Men—the question is not only “why did bad people plan atrocity,” but “why did 
ordinary people go along with it?” My purpose is not to make people feel ashamed—to do so 
only fuels the resentment behind the radical right. Instead, I hoped to demonstrate that the 
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Hungarian government’s public history, which it has made mainstream, is a politically motivated 
right-wing revision. For the Hungarian opposition to succeed, it must articulate both a self-image 
and a vision of Hungary’s past that is not anathema to the Hungarian radical right’s emphasis on 
national pride, but nonetheless studies the past critically. The radical right’s historiography is an 
extreme, but it need not be met with an opposite extreme. We can both combat the radical right’s 
historiography which is destructive and at the same time maintain that being proud of one’s 
nation is not a crime in and of itself. 
 
Afterward 
 By inventing the threat of the EUSSR and the dangers of European integration and 
Muslim immigration, Orbán fabricates the necessity of his own leadership, all while accepting 
significant EU funding for Hungarian government projects. How can Hungarians weaken his 
hold on power? The 1989 revolution offers us some lessons. First, when the communists 
lessened restrictions on free speech, the ability of the opposition to communicate with the like-
minded and articulate their dissenting views was instrumental. In Hungary today, upwards of 
seventy percent of the press is loyal to the government.186 For the opposition to succeed it must 
find ways to support independent media. In 2006 and 2008, Orbán outflanked the conservative 
right by capitalizing on the left-wing government’s corruption scandals and claiming that it was 
not only an ineffective government but an illegitimate one. These circumstances demanded 
radical solutions which Fidesz claimed the sole ability to provide. Ironically, Fidesz today is 
horrifically corrupt. Bálint Magyar has written two books about Orbán’s connections to 
 





Hungarian oligarchs, many of whom are his personal friends: The Hungarian Octopus and The 
Post-Communist Mafia State. One does not need an entire book, however, to offer a sample of 
the government’s corruption, only a newspaper article, radio show, or podcast.   
 Another lesson from 1989 is that Hungarian political parties from both the left and right 
should cooperate if they are to stand a chance. In 1989 social democrats, conservatives, and 
radical rightists such as István Csurka collaborated and accepted the results of the 1990 election. 
Conversely, it was the inability of the social democrats and the communists in the Weimar 
Republic to overcome their differences that provided the Nazi Party with the strength to enter 
government in 1933. In 2021 there is a glimmer of hope that the Hungarian opposition will unite 
as the historically extreme right Jobbik and the liberal Democratic Coalition, as well as four 
other parties, have announced their backing of a single candidate to oust Orbán in the 2022 
election.187  
 Another way that the Fidesz state could collapse is beneath the weight of its own 
promises of prosperity. While Fidesz has taken the Covid-19 pandemic seriously, offering 
generous stimulus to the population and implementing lockdowns, the economic fallout has 
nonetheless damaged the government’s popularity. Between May of 2020 and April of 2021, 
Fidesz sank from fifty-two percent popularity to forty-six percent, now beneath the united 
opposition whose combined popularity is projected at forty-nine percent.188 Furthermore, in its 
Islamophobic rhetoric Fidesz overlooks the economic incentives of immigration. With declining 
birthrates across the EU, economists project that the continent will soon suffer from labor 
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shortages and that younger generations will bear the economic burden of a growing elderly 
population that is no longer in the work force. In 2019 Fidesz sparked significant anti-
government protests towards a “slave law” enabling employers to request up to four hundred 
hours of overtime per-year.189 In addition to the labor unions, Fidesz must now also face the 
Momentum party, a growing group of young, educated parliamentarians who reject the labels of 
“liberal” and “left.” In the words of Hungarian author Stephan Ozsvath, Momentum claims, “We 
don’t want to leave Hungary. We want a future here.”190 Only one in three Hungarians aged 18-
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Appendix 1: Holocaust Timeline 
 
1918-1920: Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.  
 
June 4, 1920: Treaty of Trianon is signed at Versailles, France. 
 
1920: Numerus Clausus laws pass in Hungary 
 
January 30, 1933: Adolf Hitler becomes Chancellor of Germany. 
 
1934: Hungary signs economic agreement with Germany.  
 
September 15, 1935: Nazi Germany passes the Nuremberg Laws. 
 
1938-1941: Hungary expands territorially through its alliance with Nazi Germany, acquires 
portions of Czechoslovakia (1938), Romania (1940), and Yugoslavia (1941).  
 
March 5, 1938: Hungarian government announces the Győr Program, which is followed by the 
anti-Semitic laws of 1938-1939. 
 
1939: Hungary joins the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany and Japan. 
 
August 23, 1939: Germany and the USSR sign the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. 
 
September 1, 1939: Nazi Germany invades Poland. 
 
April 6, 1941: Nazi Germany invades Greece and Yugoslavia. 
 
June 22, 1941: Axis forces invade the Soviet Union. German mobile killing units begin 
massacring Jews, around 1.25 million by September 1943. 
 
July 31, 1941: Reinhard Heydrich announces plans for the “Final Solution of the Jewish Problem 
in Europe.” 
 
August 27-28, 1941: Einsatzgruppen massacre Carpathian Ruthenian Jews deported by Hungary 
to Kamianets-Podilskyi, Ukrainian SSR.  
 
January 20, 1942: The Wannsee Conference. Nazi leaders discuss details to implement the “Final 
Solution.” 
 
January 23, 1942: Occupying Hungarian troops massacre around 1,000 Jews at Novi Sad, Serbia. 
 
January 1943: Axis forces are defeated at the Battle of Stalingrad which is the turning point on 




March 1944: German forces invade Hungary. The Hungarian government orders its troops not to 
resist. 
 
March 31, 1944: Hungary orders all Jews to wear yellow stars.  
 
May-July 1944: Adolf Eichmann leads the deportations of rural Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz.  
 
June 6, 1944: Allied invasion of Western Europe begins. 
 
October 6, 1944: Soviet troops enter Hungarian borders.  
 
October 15, 1944: Horthy announces Hungarian defection to the USSR. Hitler supports an 
Arrow Cross coup which topples the Horthy regime and rules what remains of Hungary. 
 
October 16, 1944: The Arrow Cross regime begins the mass shooting of Budapest Jews on the 
banks of the Danube river.  
 































Appendix 2: USHMM Hungarian Holocaust Resources and Responses: 
 








USHMM Response to the House of Fates: https://www.ushmm.org/information/press/press-
releases/museum-calls-on-hungarian-government-to-honor-commitments-made-on-holocaust.  
 




USHMM on Statue of Hungarian Anti-Semite Balint Homan: 
https://www.ushmm.org/information/press/press-releases/museum-warns-of-danger-in-
hungarian-plan-to-honor-antisemitic-holocaust-era. 
 
 
 
